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Organizational	Interaction	Mechanisms	Affecting	Strategic	
Decision-Making	During	Cybercrime	Investigations		
Abstract:	
The aim of this thesis is to understand and explain organizational interaction in law 
enforcement decision-making spheres, as a phenomenon that involves the concepts of 
collaboration, cooperation and information sharing, and the way that these affect 
cybercrime investigation processes. The problem research steams from the insufficient 
interdisciplinary work and theoretical developments of social sciences within technical 
fields and more specifically the lack of conceptualizations that could guide managerial 
functions related to cyber crime investigations. As a result, Law Enforcement Agencies 
(LEAs) face increasing difficulties concerning processes, communication, and 
collaboration derived from complex information sharing needs, and in particular, issues of 
timely delivery and mistrust. The thesis is concerned with a classification of impediments 
that may obstruct investigation processes and impact strategic decision-making, and with 
the formulation of the necessary conditions to generate an optimal and collaborative 
information-sharing environment for fighting against cybercrime.  
 
The methodological approach includes qualitative content analysis, surveys, a case study 
and the use of secondary data. First, the work defines terms and differentiates concepts via 
interpretation, to help to establish an accurate mapping of the current situation within a 
cybercrime ecosystem from the stakeholders’ point of view and determine their interaction 
mechanisms. Then, it progresses onto the identification of the main obstacles and needs 
that the investigative process reveals, and proposes a new optimized model of cybercrime 
investigations analysis. This analytical tool can inform and report on the stages of the 
process that would require greater intervention. Last, the case of the Police Cybercrime 
Center (CCP) of Colombia is studied; to illustrate how these perspectives may apply. 
 
The results of this work suggest that by including management elements at the preparatory 
stage of the investigative process, functional aspects could be improved, and the 
interaction with stakeholders and the provision of information to support the criminal 
investigation can be facilitated. Furthermore, that via administrative procedures, trust 
relationships can be improved as well as information flow patterns and ultimately increase 
organizational efficiency in the fight against cybercrime.  
 
This thesis contributes with theoretical development, clarification of key terms resulting 
from the interdisciplinary integration of concepts and theories, and practical instruments 
applicable to guide managerial organizational interaction mechanisms in cybercrime 
investigations. Other contributions of meaningful implications are the results of the 
analysis of needs, the guidelines for the implementation of best practices, and the proposal 
of implementation of an optimized model of investigation based on the need of 
organizational interaction. Those conform a toolbox of practical instruments for the 
implementation of managerial techniques to enhance effectiveness and support decision-
making in combating cybercrime.  
Keywords:	
Cybercrime, investigation, organizational interaction, collaboration, cooperation, 
information sharing, decision-making,  
CERCS: T175 PHYSICAL SCIENCES – Informatics, Systems theory.	
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Organisatsioonidevaheliste	 suhete	mõju	 küberkuritegevuse	
uurimise	strateegiliste	otsuste	langetamisele	
Lühikokkuvõte:	
Antud lõputöö eesmärk on mõista ja selgitada organisatsioonide vahelist suhtlust 
õiguskorra tagamisel otsuste langetamise valdkondades kui nähtust, mis hõlmab koostöö ja 
teabe jagamise kontseptsioone ning viise, mis mõjutavad küberkuritegevuse uurimise 
protsesse. Uurimisobjekti probleem tuleneb ebapiisavast interdistsiplinaarsest tööst ja 
teoreetilistest sotsiaalteaduste arengutest tehnika vallas ning täpsemalt kavandatud 
lahenduste puudumisest, mis võiks suunata küberkuritegevuse uurimisega seotud 
juhtimisfunktsioone. Selle tulemusena seisavad õiguskaitsebürood (ÕKBd) silmitsi üha 
kasvavate raskustega, mis puudutavad nii protsesse, kommunikatsiooni kui koostööd, mis 
tulenevad keerulise teabe jagamise vajadusest. Eelkõige tekitavad raskusi küsimusi 
õigeaegne teabevahetus ja usaldamatust. Lõputöös on liigitatud takistused, mis võivad 
pidurdada uurimisprotsesse ja mõju strateegiliste otsuste langetamisel. Samuti püüab 
lõputöö sõnastada tingimused, mis on vajalikud optimaalse ja koostööl põhineva 
teabevahetuskeskkonna loomiseks, et võidelda küberkuritegevuse vastu. 
Metoodiline lähenemine hõlmab kvalitatiivset sisuanalüüsi, uuringud, juhtumikirjeldust ja 
teiseste andmete kasutamist. Esiteks, määratleb töö terminid ja eristab mõisted tõlgenduste 
kaudu, et aidata luua täpne olukorra kaardisus küberkuritegevuse ökosüsteemis. Antud 
kaardistus hõlmab nii ökosüsteemi sidusrühmade vaatepunktist ja määratleb nende 
koostoime mehhanismid. Seejärel määrtaletakse lõputöös põhilised takistused ja 
vajadused, mille uuriv protsess paljastab, ja tehakse ettepanek uue optimeeritud 
küberkuritegevuse uurimise analüüsi mudeliks. See analüütiline tööriist saab teavitada ja 
raporteerida protsessi etappidest, mis vajaks suuremat uurimist. Viimaseks, uuritakse 
Kolumbia politsei küberkuritegevuskeskuse (KKT) juhtumit, et näitlikustada, kuidas 
uuritud perspektiive saaks rakendada.  
Töö tulemused soovitavad, et funktsionaalsed aspekte saaks parandada kui lisada juhtimise 
elemente uurimisprotsessi ettevalmistavasse järku. Ühtlasi saab hõlbustada 
kriminaalmenetluse uurimisel ka suhtlust sidusrühmadega ja teabe varustamisega. Veelgi 
enam, läbi haldusmenetlusprotsesside saab parandada nii usaldussuhteid kui teabe 
liikumise mustreid ja lõpuks suurendada organisatsioonide tõhusust võitluses 
küberkuritegevusega. 
See lõputöö panustab teoreetilise baasi arendamisse, selgitab põhimõisted, mis tulenevad 
interdistsiplinaarnsest kontseptsioonide ja teooriate integratsioonist. Samuti esitleb lõputöö 
praktilisi vahendeid, mida saab kohaldada juhtimisorganisatsioonide 
koostoimemehhanismidele küberkuritegevuse uurimisel. Töös esitletakse vajaduste 
analüüsi tulemusi, parimate praktikate rakendamise suuniseid ning ettepanekut 
optimeeritud uurimismudeli ellurakendamiseks, mis lähtub organisatsiooni suhtluse 
vajadustest. Eelnimetatud moodustavad tööriistkasti praktilistest vahenditest, mida 
rakendada juhtimistehnikates, et suurendada tõhusust ja toetada otsuste tegemist võitluses 
küberkuritegevusega. 
Võtmesõnad:	
Küberkuritegevus, uurimine, institutsiooniline koostoime, koostöö, teabe jagamine, otsuste 
langetamine 
CERCS: T175 REAALTEADUSED - Informaatika, süsteemiteooria 
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1 Introduction	
Concerns about the effectiveness of the fight against cybercrime have increased because of 
the rapidly evolving nature of cyber threats, procedural obstacles, and collaboration 
complexities associated with criminal investigation processes. As one of the major 
challenges for decision makers, this situation has forced organizations and specifically 
managers of Law Enforcement Agencies LEAs, to rethink cybercrime strategies. The 
urgent need to improve specialized reactions may require the interaction of different 
specialized stakeholders, well-trained cybercrime police units, and well-equipped teams 
with access to the latest technical and forensic tools.  
This may also require the promotion of collaborative information sharing practices and 
strengthening of capacity building to overcome some of the most common problems 
affecting effective responses. Lack of administration management procedures; legal and 
procedural obstacles; privacy questions; trust issues; low interest from partners; technical 
barriers; and, delays in providing information, and mandatory report mechanisms have 
been identified as such. These deficiencies could be attributed to setbacks in the 
investigative process, lack of consensus on basic terminology and the very nature of 
cybercrime, lack of expertise, confidence and knowledge on how to cooperate and to 
which extent and distrust between those who must interact. 
The general purpose of this work is to understand and explain organizational interaction in 
law enforcement decision making spheres, as a phenomenon that involves the concepts of 
collaboration, cooperation and information sharing, and the way that these affect 
cybercrime investigation processes. 
To address the complexities of cybercrime investigations from the perspective of top 
management decisions, it emphasizes the relevance of computational social sciences 
research. Non-technical aspects may have a direct impact on the networks in all their 
layers and in cyber security where the narrow topic of decision-making process on 
cybercrime investigations is nested. This thesis proposes a conceptualization and 
theoretical advancements that could help minimize the problem of insufficient 
interdisciplinary theoretical developments of social sciences within technical fields. 
Specifically, on factors that guide managerial functions related to cybercrime 
investigations. Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) face increasing difficulties concerning 
processes, communication, and collaboration schemes derived from complex information 
sharing needs, and in particular, issues of timely delivery and mistrust. In accordance with 
the aforementioned scope, the following Research Questions RQ will be addressed: 
RQ1.
  
What are the impediments that may obstruct cybercrime investigation 
processes that could impact strategic decision-making?  
RQ2.  What are the necessary conditions to generate an optimal and collaborative 
sharing information environment for fighting against cybercrime?  
The methodological approach selected   included qualitative content analysis, surveys, a 
case study and the use of secondary data. They match the research tasks that follow, but 
details of their use will be explained in the corresponding section: 
RT1 Definition and differentiation of concepts and key terms 
RT2 Mapping the current state of the organizational interaction during cybercrime 
investigations. 
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RT3 Identification of the main obstacles and needs on the investigative process. 
RT4 Comparative analysis of cybercrime investigation processes and existing 
models. 
RT5 Proposing an optimized model of cybercrime investigations based on 
interaction needs. 
RT6 Applicability of the optimized model using the information on needs 
RT7 Study case of the Police Cybercrime Center (CCP) 
RT8 Survey design and findings review applied to the diagnosis of the current state 
of organizational interaction at the CCP 
RT9 Formulation of a set of guidelines to promote collaborative interaction on 
cybercrime investigations 
RT1 is based on the literature review, documents analysis and revision of secondary data 
from various fields: law, criminology, and the social sciences. Terms and concepts of 
cybercrime and strategic decision-making are reviewed and interpreted, underlying that 
precision is achieved after differentiating the concepts. The review-concerned terminology 
associated with organizational interaction mechanisms such as collaboration, cooperation, 
and sharing information. RT2 is performed with the use of document analysis and 
secondary data that includes all information contained within the e-Crime Project EU 
20151. The mapping of the organizational interaction allocates stakeholders, key players, 
and the perpetration cycle within the cybercrime ecosystem produced by the 
aforementioned project. RT3 compiles collaboration, cooperation and information sharing 
needs of the LEAs collected from the conceptual analysis and drawing from the academic 
literature review, and from ENISA’s2 and HTCIA’s3 reports.  RT4 compares five of the 
most representative models of investigation process from different perspectives, on each 
of their stages. RT5 formulates an optimized model of cybercrime investigations analysis 
based on the organizational interaction needs. RT6 applies the criteria recommended 
included in the model resulting from RT5, classifying and categorizing needs, to inform 
and report the stages of the process that would require greater intervention. RT7 studies 
the phenomena within Colombia at the Cybercrime Center. To proceed with this task, 
documentary analysis, official information and professional expertise were determining 
sources of insight.  RT8 Was performed with an instrument distributed to a convenience 
sample of 40 officials belonging to CCP with experience in investigation processes. 
Finally, the RT9 applies the perspectives put forward by this work and concludes with a 
set of guidelines that may help to increase the effectiveness of the investigative process. 
The present thesis is organized into five main parts: Methodology, explaining the research 
strategy and design. Theoretical background, determining the scope and definitions 
starting from documenting the relevance of the research problem, and defining cybercrime 
and related aspects of collaboration, cooperation and information sharing. Organizational 
Interaction within Cybercrime Investigations is divided in Conceptual Developments, and 
Contextualization of the Cybercrime Field Process Analysis. It is appropriating concepts 
via interpretation, and establishing an accurate mapping of the current situation within a 
cybercrime ecosystem from the stakeholders’ point of view, determining their interaction 
mechanisms. Practical Applications, by modelling cybercrime investigation process, 
                                                
1 Available at http://ecrime-project.eu/about 
2 Available at https://www.enisa.europa.eu 
3 Available at https://www.htcia.org 
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proposing a new optimized model of cybercrime investigations analysis, identifying the 
needs that the investigative process reveals, a study case of the Police Cybercrime Center 
(CCP) of Colombia is reviewed, and surveys, illustrates how these perspectives may apply 
using proposed guidelines. Finally, concluding remarks with the limitations of this study 
and the avenues that are made available for further research.  
The larger discussion furthered by this work suggest that by including management 
elements at the preparatory stage of the cybercrime investigation process, functional 
aspects (affected by the nature of these illicit conducts) could be improved, and the 
interaction between stakeholders can be facilitated. Furthermore, that via administrative 
procedures, trust relationships can be improved as well as information flow patterns. 
These effects have the potential to increase organizational efficiency in the fight against 
cybercrime. 
The contributions of this thesis are, theoretical development, clarification of key terms 
resulting from the interdisciplinary integration of concepts and theories, and a practical 
instrument applicable to guide managerial organizational interaction mechanisms in 
cybercrime investigations. Other contributions of meaningful implications are the results 
of the analysis of needs, the guidelines for the implementation of best practices, and the 
proposal of implementation of an optimized model of investigation based on the need of 
organizational interaction. Those conform a toolbox of practical instruments for the 
implementation of managerial techniques to enhance effectiveness and support decision-
making in combating cybercrime. The work is geared towards the managers in Law 
Enforcement Agencies LEA´s, or anyone interested in consulting collaborative 
investigation processes.  
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2 Methodology	
The phenomena of organizational interaction in law enforcement decision making spheres 
under investigation, was considered to benefit most from a constructivist methodological 
approach that could help understand and explain the implications that affect cybercrime 
investigation processes. Therefore, the research problem is addressed using qualitative 
methods that prevailed for the data collection and the evaluation of the cybercrime 
investigative process. The processing of data collected is interpretative to achieve a valid 
exploratory document analysis on one hand and on the other, a mixed exploratory and 
confirmatory survey analysis that also included one open question, subject to qualitative 
analysis. Consequently, even if one of the collection methods is typically used in 
quantitative research, that is the survey, in this case, it had a limited reach and did not 
intend to support fundamental contributions. The additional open question on the survey 
administered as described below was analyzed as the rest of the documents by using, 
categorizations, classifications, conceptual modelling, visualization techniques, and 
charting. 
The data regarding the theoretical contribution and the models was obtained from several 
academic articles and official documents, and secondary data taken from the e-crime 
project 4, as the main source of information, for establishing the current state on 
cybercrime and for making conceptualization and clarification of key terminology in the 
organizational interaction field, by the integration of different disciplines of law, 
criminology, and computational social sciences. 
The data collected from surveys compile self-reported information about personal 
perception of real world cybercrime investigators, helping to understand the current 
situation of the Colombia Cybercrime Center. The analysis of this information is also 
qualitative and supplies empirical data that is used to determine the current status of the 
stakeholder’s interaction and enriches the understanding of the phenomena discussed. 
Detailed report on the methods will be explained in the corresponding section below.  
  
                                                
4 Available at: http://ecrime-project.eu/about 
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3 Theoretical	Background	
This section lays the theoretical foundations, determines the scope and defines key 
concepts contained in this work. It starts from documenting the relevance of the research 
problem, and defining cybercrime and related aspects of collaboration, cooperation and 
information sharing. Then it introduces the new concept of organizational interaction as an 
encompassing phenomenon deserving of study, in particular in the context of law 
enforcement decision-making spheres where all these concerns have received little 
attention so far. 
Gercke wrote that the changing nature of cybercrime is due in part to the increasing 
ubiquity of global connectivity, the complexity of global cyber criminal networks, and 
difficulties identifying links between the perpetrator and the crime [1]. Whereas Yar noted 
that the phenomenon of cybercrime is not new, or qualitatively different from ordinary 
crimes, but some novelty lies in new modalities and the use of virtual environments for 
their execution [2]. Crimes are evolving according to the expansion of the Internet, 
spreading rapidly and therefore, causing extensive damage. Criminals employ more 
sophisticated technology and seem to be ahead, more knowledgeable than cyber security 
professionals and LEAs [3].  Politically motivated cybercrime weaponry, and command 
and control systems have also moved into cyberspace to deploy and execute espionage and 
sabotage activities, according to Marshall and KPMG practitioners. [3], [4] 
The complexity, barriers and obstacles that arise during cybercrime investigation have 
been discussed extensively in different spheres by authors such as Brown and institutions 
like ENISA [5], [6]. Also, the United Nations (UN) conducted an extensive study on 
cybercrime, stressing the importance of better information exchange, legal harmonization, 
implementation of best practices, technical assistance, and international cooperation. It 
mentioned the following key issues: The impact of fragmentation on international levels 
and diversity of national cybercrime laws on international cooperation; excessive reliance 
on traditional means of formal international cooperation in criminal matters, involving 
cybercrime and electronic evidence; location; regulatory harmonization; law enforcement 
and criminal justice capacity; and, cybercrime prevention activities [7]. The study 
mentioned preventive strategies that could help tackle cybercrime such as “the 
promulgation of legislation, effective leadership, development of criminal justice, law 
enforcement capacity” building, “education and awareness”, and international and 
private cooperation [7]. Bednar also emphasized on information sharing and collaboration 
trough the incorporation of interest groups, with contrasted worldviews, languages, and 
cultures into decision-making levels, to help overcome the negative implications of the 
poor quality of information presently prevailing in cybercrime investigations, and other 
investigative processes [8].  
According to the report made by Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the obstacles 
evidenced in police investigations, prosecution and forensic practices are frequently 
associated with lack of reporting, unclear models, and deficiencies on formal standards in 
this area. It coincide with authors such as Broadhurst, who claims the quickness which 
cybercrime crosses borders, legal differences between countries, and tricks used by 
criminals, could prevent attribution, prevent interrogation of suspects, and hinder the 
detention of offenders [9], [10]. Brown further argues that, the lack of capacity of 
investigators, prosecutors, judges, and jurors to understand the illicit use of technology 
could impact conviction rates [5]. In the context of collaboration, cooperation, and 
information sharing, ENISA highlighted difficulties related to “lack of administrative 
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management procedures, legal and procedural obstacles, privacy questions, trust issues, 
low interest from partners, technical barriers, intentional delays, and mandatory 
mechanisms” [11]. 
Cybercrime has become one of the biggest challenges for governments, organizations, and 
LEAs, creating the need for immediate action to reduce the existing risks and counteract 
the negative impact caused by impunity [1]. Actions’ effectiveness is affected by time and 
speed, especially if they are performed by various instances, this has been recorded for 
example in the report made by the Dutch government on public private partnership, where 
Luiijf & Kernkamp stated “The timely and speedy sharing of information between 
organizations is widely perceived as one of the most effective measures to address 
cybersecurity challenges in organizations” [12]. Cerezo emphasizes on the need for 
international cooperation between countries and institutions properly backed by laws for 
the success in combating, investigation and prosecution of such crimes. The harmonization 
on international relations and the establishment of conventions and directives, could 
increase the competent fight against cybercrime [13].  
The International community and cybersecurity practitioners concerned about the startling 
growth of cybercrime are making attempts to measure what has been considered an 
exponential growth in, costs, and impact on online users and enterprises. For example, 
Ponemon Institute discusses the evolution of cybercrime in terms of frequency and 
severity affectation to businesses. The study conducted in 252 companies from 7 
representative countries, evidenced an average of $7.7 million USD annual costs 
documented in 1928 attacks, increasing by 1.9 percent per year [14]. The security report 
by Norton 2016 already show that more than 594 million of online consumers were 
affected by cybercrime; 348 million identities from trusted institutions were exposed, and 
losses rose to for more than 150 billion USD were reported only in 17 countries that were 
surveyed [15]. According to the UN 2013 report, cybercrime victimization rates are higher 
than conventional crime in online population. For example, conducts such as email 
hacking, phishing, identity theft, online credit card fraud, vary between 1 and 17 percent, 
instead burglary, robbery, and car theft; from 0 to 13 per cent. Also, European private 
sector report rates between 2 and 16 percent of data breaches, outside attacks, and data 
corruption [7]. The IC3 reported 269,422 complaints with more tan 800 million USD 
losses in the US only in 2014, revealing the growing impact of social media and the 
emergence of virtual currency transactions in cybercrime [16].  
The Colombian case evidenced the typical exponential increase of the international scene. 
However, because since the Government is the committed to invest time efforts and 
resources to counteract cybercrime, the number of reports has increased markedly. For 
example, in 2014 3.871 crimes were reported, and 2015, 6.366. Most correspond to 
defacement cases: (34.4%, 15.5% to online scam, 8.9% to identity theft, 7% phishing, and 
5.2% to smishing) [17]. 
Defining Cybercrime 
Because of the confusion between the terms cybercrime and computer related crimes, the 
Tenth United Nations Congress on the prevention of crime and treatment of offenders, 
have differentiated these terms. “In a narrow sense (computer crime) as: “Any illegal 
behaviour directed by means of electronic operations that targets the security of computer 
systems and the data processed by them”. And “Cybercrime in a broader sense” 
(computer-related crime) as: “Any illegal behaviour committed by means of, or in relation 
to, a computer system or network, including such crimes as illegal possession and offering 
or distributing information by means of a computer system or network”[18]. 
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The Cybercrime Convention and its additional protocols describe cybercrime as “criminal 
activities where computers and information systems are involved either as a primary tool 
or as a primary target”. This work subscribes to it. The convention also contemplates a 
broad range of these activities such as: “Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of computer systems and data (Illegal access, illegal interception, data 
interference, system interference and misuse of devices); Computer-related offenses (e.g. 
fraud, forgery); Content-related offenses (e.g. content violations, child pornography); and 
offenses related to infringements of copyright and related rights (e.g. copyright 
intellectual property)” [19] 
The Convention also defines: computer system, computer data, service provider and traffic 
data. However, it does not include standard typologies of crimes committed or facilitated 
using computer technologies such as money laundering, identity theft or storage of illegal 
contents as Alkaabi does. [20]. 
Collaboration 
Collaboration is a term shared across multiple disciplines, but its interpretation depends on 
the theoretical perspective, and how it is assessed and studied. A universal definition of 
collaboration especially in the context of crime investigations is not available. Thomson 
argued that, precision becomes a challenge for scholars and practitioners in finding an 
approximate definition about the extent, parameters and evaluation of the term in theory 
and practice, [21]. And also, some difficulties of reaching agreement on definitions, due to 
a shortage of studies on measuring of collaboration [22].  
The extensive study performed by Mattessich sheds some light on the matter, defining 
collaboration as  “mutually beneficial and well defined relationship entered into by two or 
more organizations to achieve common goals”. It also identifies some factors of influence 
classified in six groups: environment; membership; process structure; communication; 
purpose; and resource [23]. Another collection of works performed by Wood & Gray, 
defined as “Collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem 
domain engages in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures, to 
act or decide on issues related to that domain” [24] 
In addition, Thomson & Perry have conducted extensive studies incorporating those 
mentioned above, and included the evolution of collaboration, participation of 
stakeholders and of multidimensionality, interpreting collaboration as: “The process in 
which autonomous or semi-autonomous actors interact through formal and informal 
negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to 
act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared 
norms and mutually beneficial interactions” [25]. This work will elaborate on the bases of 
this definition. 
Cooperation  
Mangal studies starts from the etymology of the word, which indicates two components. 
The term combines co and operation, meaning a work together, that is undertaken at the 
time [26]. Some definitions agree on the search of mutual benefit instead competing, 
including terms such as common effort 5, working together6, or willingness to help 
someone in need 7. An extensive study of the evolution of cooperation collects most of the 
                                                
5 Available at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cooperation 
6 Available at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/cooperation 
7 Available at: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/cooperation 
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terms related above, saying that “Cooperation is the process of groups or organisms, 
working or acting together for common or mutual benefit, as opposed to working in 
competition for selfish benefit” [27].  
Mattessich also speaks of cooperation interpreted the term as the “Informal relationship 
existing without commonly defined mission, structure or planning effort. Information is 
shared as needed, and authority is retained by each organization so there is virtually no 
risk” [23]. In contrast, Thomson & Perry stated “Collaboration connotes a durable and 
pervasive relationship, bringing separated organizations in a full commitment to a 
common mission, requiring well-defined communication channels, operation in many 
levels and contributing their own resources and reputation”.  Therefore, when 
cooperation holds a common goal, it becomes collaboration; this also implies reciprocity 
and sharing of resources, but not necessarily in a symmetric way. Collaboration can 
advance individual goals, but some result should be shared [25]. This work will elaborate 
a differentiation and proper use of the term on the conceptual development section, 
appropriating the definitions related above  
Information Sharing 
According to Goodwin information is power. He states that “receiving the right 
information at the right time can empower decision-makers to reduce risks, deter 
attackers, and enhance resilience”, and Cybersecurity information sharing describes “the 
means of conveying information or experience from one trusted part to another”. An 
effective program also requires a detailed understanding of “the actors involved; types of 
information exchanged; models and mechanisms of exchange; and, the scope and 
operational purpose” [28]. According to Luiijf, the competencies of information sharing 
could cover strategic, tactical, operational and technical levels, and the properties expand 
throughout the phases of incidents response cycle. At the same time, the process is highly 
dynamic, crosses the boundary of the public and private domains, and sharing sensitive 
information can be very useful for some stakeholders, but potentially harmful to others 
[12].  
ENISA developed some proposals to raise awareness of the practice of information 
sharing, defining it as “the exchange of a variety of network and security related 
information such as risks, vulnerabilities, threats, internal security issues and good 
practices” [6], [11], [29], [30]. It has also distinguished between disclosure, sharing, and 
exchange of information. The first implies a one-way communication, broadcasting to 
multiple recipients.  Receivers are usually unknown, and there is no expectation of getting 
anything in return. In the second, the recipients are known or trusted, and there is an 
expectation of receiving something in return. And the last constitutes a bi-directional, one-
to-one activity where the beneficiary delivers something in return [30]. This work will 
elaborate on the bases of the definitions related above, and the parameters proposed by 
ENISA on the conceptual development section,  
Decision-Making  
The expression is understood as the process of strategically choosing between alternatives. 
Given its importance to handle any human affair, decision-making has been widely 
theorized about and from different perspectives. The social sciences have described 
decision-making in various ways. The Institute of International Management Sciences as 
“The process by which individuals select a course of action from among alternatives to 
produce a desired result” [31]. Wang & Ruhe as “To choose a preferred option or a 
course of actions from among a set of alternatives on the basis of given criteria or 
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strategies” [32]. Al – Taraweneh as “The process of choosing among alternative courses 
of action for the purpose of solving a problem or attaining a better situation regarding the 
opportunities that exist” [33]; or, Babcock & Morse as “The process of making a 
conscious choice between two or more rational alternatives in order to select the one that 
will produce the most desirable consequences (benefits) relative to unwanted 
consequences (costs)" [34].  
The scope and definition of decision-making will be determined in the section of 
conceptual developments, adopting some of the concepts studied on the theoretical 
background and advancing them. 
All in all, the terminology studied reflects commonalities between the terms collaboration, 
cooperation and information sharing, and will be grouped under an encompassing 
umbrella term referred to in the following as Organizational Interaction. The expression 
will be studied as a phenomenon, without diminishing the importance of the separated 
entities in independent theoretical constructs. 
 
4 Organizational	Interaction	within	Cybercrime	Investigations	
This section progresses in the adaptation of concepts and terminology studied on the 
theoretical foundations and differentiates via interpretation.  The first part is presenting the 
conceptual developments introducing into the context the concepts of cybercrime, 
collaboration, cooperation, information sharing, strategic decision-making, and 
organizational interaction mechanisms. The second refers to the contextualization of the 
cybercrime field process analysis, identifying connections between stakeholders, key 
players; the perpetration cycle; and, the cybercrime ecosystem based on the extensive 
study performed by the ecrime project [35]. Then, it is establishing an accurate mapping of 
the current situation within a cybercrime ecosystem from the stakeholders’ point of view, 
and determines their interrelations between main components. With the integration of 
these concepts and theories within the different disciplines of law, criminology, and social 
sciences, it could get a better understanding of the phenomenon under study, and associate 
it into a single interpretation. 
4.1	Conceptual	Developments	
Cybercrime in Context 
The literature review evidenced that there is no consensus on the definition of cybercrime, 
and the term is being influenced by changes, evolution, differences in culture, and the 
legal system in place[36]. It is also open to a diversity of social, political, practical and 
scientific interpretations [37]. However, due to no boundaries exists, it is acknowledged by 
all that we must talk about it as a transnational phenomenon. The transnationality of 
cybercrime is the source of one of the most intense discussion at all levels, and the issue of 
jurisdiction and competencies that suffer has not been fully solved. 
Due to the great variety of approaches in the search for a taxonomy of cybercrime, there 
are a variety of proposals for different authors, agencies and organizations. Most of the 
definitions come from social, political, practical and scientific context, and from the field 
of technology, criminology, and law. This study has considered the most universally 
accepted definition, adopting The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 2001, 
widely known as the Budapest Convention [38]. Because this is the most accepted and 
recognized document by the international community on cybersecurity, and also the most 
used as a basis to refer to cooperation needs, legislation, and cybercrime investigations. 
Accordingly, cybercrime could be interpreted henceforth as “any criminal activities where 
computers and information systems are involved either as a primary tool or as a primary 
target”. It comprises “Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computer systems and data (Illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system 
interference and misuse of devices). Computer-related offenses (e.g. fraud, forgery). 
Content-related offenses (e.g. content violations, child pornography). And offenses related 
to infringements of copyright and related rights (e.g. copyright intellectual property)”[19]. 
Collaboration on Cybercrime Investigations  
The importance of analyzing collaboration of managers during cybercrime investigations 
is posed by the organizational interaction needs, which are imposed within the 
investigative process. The need for managers to interact with different stakeholders 
demands the implementation of efficient models, formal or informal mechanisms, and 
promotion relationships of trust. In this context, one could start by assuming that a typical 
cybercrime scene investigation can be viewed as a special case of collaborative decision-
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making. The investigative process can potentially involve a variety of stakeholders from 
different types and nationalities, trying to combine efforts by the interaction of several 
actors from different disciplines, socio-cultural backgrounds and different legal 
frameworks. It might increase the complexity and the need for collaboration that supports 
the decision-making on cases of cybercrime [8]  
Because of the nature and interdependence among stakeholders involved in cybercrime 
investigation processes, it is important to identify each of them and determine their 
capacity and scope of collaboration. The promotion of international cooperation and 
reduction of legal and procedural obstacles to effective collaboration could be achieved 
through improving information flows, supporting the implementation of coordinated 
bodies, exchange of experiences among communities, and adoption of safe protocols and 
security measures [29].  
The literature review has indicated some confusion on the proper use of terms associated 
with collaboration. The significance of integrating theories into computational social 
sciences terminology is due in grand part to the widespread and interchangeable use of 
terms, and unawareness of differences in depth of interaction, integration, commitment, 
and complexity [25]. Therefore, it would be advisable to treat each one individually, 
making theoretical precision and properly delimitation of concepts. 
For this work, it could be considered the definition stated by Thomson & Perry. They 
interpreted “collaboration as the process in which autonomous or semi-autonomous 
actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and 
structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that 
brought them together” The process involves shared norms and mutually beneficial 
interactions [25] Thomson’s definition has adopted the studies mentioned in the literature 
reviewed; include the evolution of collaboration, the participation of stakeholders and 
multidimensionality; and five key dimensions of governance, administration, mutuality, 
norms, and organizational autonomy. They also remarked on the importance of 
collaboration costs and the significance of equilibrium between the variables described in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 Collaboration Dimensions adapted from Thomson & Perry [22] 
DIMENSION DESCRIPTION HOW TO ACHIEVE 
 
Governance 
Making joint decisions about rules 
to govern the collaborative effort. 
“Creating structures that allow to make choices 
about how to solve the collective action problems 
they face by developing sets of working rules 
about who is eligible to make them” 
 
Administration 
“Getting things done through an 
effective operating system that 
supports clarity of roles and 
effective communication channels”. 
Implementing and managing administrative 
structures for agreeing goals and coordinating 
activities to achieve a goal. 
 
Organizational 
Autonomy 
“Addressing the implicit tension 
exhibited in collaborations between 
organizational self-interests and the 
collective interests of the group”  
“Achieving individual organizational missions 
and maintaining an identity distinct from the 
collaborative, and a collective interests”. 
Maintaining accountability to collaborative 
partners and their stakeholders. 
 
Mutuality 
Working through difference to 
arrive at mutually beneficial 
relationships 
Keeping interdependence, obtaining mutual 
benefits interpedently, based either on differing 
interests or on shared interests.  
 
Norms 
Developing trust and modes of 
reciprocity  
Promoting reciprocal benefits and obligations. 
Besides the ‘‘I-will-if-you-will’, partners m will 
equalize the distribution of costs and benefits over 
time out of a sense of duty. 
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The above table summarizes the collaboration dimension´s, proposed by Thomson & 
Perry [21]. The five categories of the multidimensional perspective are listed on the first 
column; second describes the main features and the expected results; and third exemplifies 
possible ways to achieve collaboration. This compilation only suggests the importance of 
these properties on the implementation of collaborative mechanisms. However, it would 
be necessary to make measurements in practice and enclosed within a community or a 
circle of stakeholders, to make an empirical interpretation of collaboration on cybercrime 
investigations. 
Cooperation to Fight Cybercrime 
The found literature refers to terms associated with collaboration and cooperation as 
synonyms or supplements. This could be because there is not sufficient awareness of the 
proper use of these terms and the differences have not yet been fully clarified. However, it 
is important to recognize that there is a standard relative level of awareness on the need of 
incorporate efficient models and methods, but each of these terms represents diverse forms 
of contribution to a group and each comes with its own dynamics and power structures. 
The definitions studied in the literature review suggest that cooperation has a lower level 
of action than collaboration. On the one hand, collaboration refers to the sum of 
individuals who come together to reach to an end, and on the other, cooperation is the 
need to interact with individuals to come to an end [25]. For the purposes of this work, it is 
important to perform a wide differentiation in the use of these terms, interpreting the 
concept of cooperation as the arrangement or process with the aim of uniting a group, in 
which different stakeholders come together voluntarily to meet their individual interests, 
with independent goals in combating cybercrime. 
Diferent scholars and practicioners have discussed extensively on the importance of 
implementing high levels of cooperation among stakeholders in the fight against 
Cybercrime. For example, Brown states that responses for private sector assistance are 
generally slow creating difficulties to cybercrime investigations, prosecution, and 
interrogations. The acceptance of mandatory cooperation could affect the efficacy of 
police investigations, and jurisdiction goes beyond international borders, delaying the 
work of investigators in bringing offenders to justice [5]. The Police Executive Research 
Forum PERF says that investigators are frequently confronted with legal constraints on 
criminal justice process, they require more streamlined cooperation with Internet Service 
Providers ISP, private corporations and other local, state and federal agencies when 
investigations crosses multiple jurisdictions [9]. ENISA works also emphasize on the 
promotion of informal discussions and face-to-face meetings with regular intervals, 
moderated or facilitated by regulatory authorities, to help in the establishment of trusted 
platforms and improve information flows between stakeholders [6]. 
The importance of cooperation is also highlighted on the Budapest Convention, which is 
the most accepted guideline for domestic legislation, and used as a framework for 
international cooperation.  It emphasizes the need of enhancing cooperation through the 
effective application of its standards, and supporting others bilateral, regional and 
international agreements on cooperation. It is evidenced in Articles 23 to 35 in relation to 
international cooperation, extradition and mutual assistance, including legislative 
adjustments and improved procedures police-to-police and judicial cooperation. Moreover, 
Articles 29 and 31, stated on international preservation requests and the commitment made 
17 
 
by participants in compliance with the principles and guidelines given by the convention 
and the Cybercrime Convention Committee.[38]. 
A wide range of cooperation requirements has been discussed through various initiatives 
and mechanisms of participation at international, regional and local levels. They agree on 
the importance of incorporating cooperation factors on cybercrime strategies. For instance, 
United Nations (UN) provides assistance to countries to develop cybercrime strategies, 
especially in legal and procedural support, and regional and international instruments for 
cooperation [7]. The International Telecommunication Union has highlighted the 
importance of cooperation with governments and the private sector, specially on 
international spheres [36]. Current models of cooperation are not satisfactory effective, 
they are based on analogous or traditional investigations patterns or demands in the real 
world, but cybercrime is transnational in nature, which means that is not restricted to a 
single crime scene [39]. Consequently, it appears that decision-makers should take into 
account for the implementation of strategies against cybercrime, the inclusion of such 
cooperative efforts to meet the needs of LEAs on conducting international cases, joint 
investigations and coordinated responses.  
Some of the existent initiatives to support the work of LEA's are focusing efforts on 
implementing strategies assisting complex collaborative decision-making. Police forces 
and investigation agencies at local, regional, and international levels are more aware of 
working under collaboration and cooperation schemes. For example, the European 
Cybercrime Centre EC38 was established to strengthen law enforcement response to 
cybercrime in the European Union (EU). They concentrate their efforts in helping to 
protect European citizens, businesses, and governments, providing a variety of strategic 
analysis products supporting decision-making. The Global Cybercrime Expert Group 2014 
INTERPOL9 was created with the aim to advice on policy formulation, the 
implementation of cyber programs and operations. They promote the exchange of 
information and best practices, and assistance in developing long-term cybersecurity 
strategies in the world. The AMERIPOL Cybercrime Center 10 is an emerging interagency 
collaboration initiative between INTERPOL and EUROPOL, created in response to the 
need for preparation of cyber police in the development and specialization of criminals 
and terrorists. PERF also mentioned the role of LEA’s in preventing and investigating 
cybercrime, and the need for developing comprehensive strategies to overcome different 
obstacles [9]. They also remarked on underreporting of crimes by individuals and 
corporations, inadequate awareness of this issue by public officials and the public, and 
difficulties in handling crimes that stretch across multiple jurisdictions. The FBI National 
Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force NCIJTF11, supports information sharing, incident 
response, joint enforcement and intelligence actions among national and local 
communities. The UK National Cybercrime Unit NCCU12 helping the fight cybercrime by 
providing experience and response to cyber threats. The Bundeskriminalamt BKA13 has 
established support mechanisms by the "Service Center for Information and 
                                                
8 Available: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/megamenu/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3-1837 
9 Available:http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Cybercrime 
10Available:http://www.ameripol.org/portalAmeripol/appmanager/portal/desk?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=port
als_portal_page_m2p1p2&content_id=66089&folderNode1=66002 
11Available:  https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/cyber-task-forces-building-alliances-to-
improve-the-nations-cybersecurity-1 
12 Available: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/national-cyber-crime-unit 
13Available:http://www.bka.de/nn_194550/EN/SubjectsAZ/InternetCrime/internetCrime__node.html?__nnn
=true 
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Communications" and the "High Tech and Computer Crime". 
The adherence and participation on the presented initiatives could be considered as very 
useful and profitable tool for managers for supporting decision-making. This brief 
compilation of actions shows that given the growing threats on cybercrime, there is a 
concern and awareness of the benefits of establishing or joining mechanisms of 
cooperation and mutual help. However, this does not preclude the obligation of countries 
to act independently, adjusting to their particular needs and prioritizing internal resources 
to fight crimes. This could also indicate that stakeholders could prefer to concentrate their 
efforts in requiring more cooperation, rather than offer or provide it. 
Cybercrime Information Sharing 
In the context of cybersecurity, there is a more or less general agreement that collaboration 
and sharing of information help reduce risks, but also, there are some confusion and 
controversy surrounding their implementation. Information sharing has become a common 
term within the cybersecurity community, but there is no certainty of what and when 
exactly should be shared, how much ought to be shared, and what can be done with the 
information shared [28]. The importance of the acceptance and implementation of 
common information patterns sharing in cooperation models could be considered useful to 
improve the quality of the information collected for decision-making. This could allow 
others to reduce risks, defend, detect and improve responsiveness to the cybercrime in a 
harmonized way.  
For the purposes of this work, it might be advisable to appropriate the concepts and 
differentiation of terms suggested by ENISA works. In this regard, information sharing 
could be interpreted as the good practice for the exchange of a cybercrime related 
information between one trusted part to another. It could be a variety of data related to 
risks, vulnerabilities, threats, security issues and provision of information to support the 
criminal investigation process. The organizational interaction among stakeholders could 
be accessible by disclosure, broadcast, sharing, and exchange of information [30]. 
ENISA’s efforts are also focused on information sharing needs between CSIRTs and 
LEAs, with the aim to enhance cooperation between members’ states on the European 
Union (EU) when combating cybercrime. They found that some of the main obstacles in 
the exchange of information are prevalent in the current lack of standardization and 
misunderstanding on how to perform the exchange, limiting the amount of information 
that can be shared, and the possibilities of automation of these processes. Their proposals 
depart from the construction of new mechanisms based on a common taxonomy, and 
following a roadmap for this implementation [40] Some of these arguments coincide with 
the High Technology Crime Investigation Association HTCIA [41][42]. They have 
claimed the need for promoting ideas for training, education and information sharing 
between law enforcement and corporate cybercrime investigators, based on the promotion 
of voluntary exchange of information, experiences, ideas and knowledge about methods, 
processes, and techniques relating to investigations and security in advanced technologies 
in the field of cybercrime.[41] Their reports conclude on the need of improvement of 
information sharing and collaboration between law enforcement and corporate cybercrime 
investigators, and the establishment of cyber crime reporting, strategies, and policies [41], 
[43], [44]. The results of these studies demonstrate the emerging need to share information 
among stakeholders and emphasize the need to increase levels of awareness, promoting 
the construction of a policy, legislation and mechanisms of participation. In addition, they 
note the disadvantages of not having this form of collaboration, and weaknesses in relation 
to the growth and professionalization of criminal activity on cyberspace. 
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In contrast, the implementations of such solutions are not entirely accepted by some 
actors. Sometimes they are reluctant to share information because fear of liability if shared 
information turns out to be wrong or causes unintended damage. Also the tendency to 
avoid loses of prestige; face legal conflicts on freedom of information, and worries that 
shared information might be used against the company by regulators. Effective 
information sharing requires the government to share fully and in a timely manner with the 
private sector through a public-private partnership established for this purpose [45]. 
Experts have criticized the expected efficacy of information sharing and the provisions for 
clarifying ambiguities, agreeing on the convenience but also concerned about privacy 
issues. When the legislation goes from theory to practice, the exchange of information is 
positive with benefits for companies under attack, but the rules of procedure will delay the 
process. They acknowledge that criminals are well organized and can act rapidly and 
undeterred by the laws and procedures, while institutional action is slow, paced and 
constrained by the law [46]  
In summary, understanding the practice of sharing information as a form of collaboration, 
it can be seen that today the need for the implementation of this practice as support for 
cybercrime investigations is increasingly accepted. The implementation of these models at 
organizational levels is currently promoting, and the greatest needs are in the supply of 
information by private sector and other investigation agencies. However, there is also a 
resistance level of participation of this practice that should be recognized and treated in 
depth by decision-makers, providing strong protections to sharers, and establishing a 
public-private partnership to facilitate sharing. In addition, most of the arguments studied 
agree on the importance of voluntary exchange of information, but also on the possible 
disadvantages and risks involved. Mandatory mechanisms might not be suitable in all 
cases because these do not constitute genuine cooperation and could be coercive. 
However, voluntary agreements could drive organizations with privacy issues that just 
avoid the exchange of information, as they can keep getting useful information from the 
government and different stakeholders, causing setbacks or lack of trust in the practice of 
sharing information. 
Strategic Decision-Making On Cybercrime Investigations 
According to the Institute of International Management Sciences, the practice of decision-
making could be a difficult exercise. It is the product of deliberation, evaluation, and 
thoughts that managers follow in a sequential set of steps into a process [31]. Models of 
these processes have been presented by several researchers in the literature [33]. However, 
the one proposed by Baker seems standard and also is widely accepted in the literature. It 
starts from “the identification of actors, reducing the possible disagreement about 
problem definition, requirements, goals, and criteria”. Then, it is conducted by defining 
the problem, determining the requirements that the solution to the problem must meet, 
establish goals that solving the problems should accomplish, and identify options and 
other alternatives. Finally, by developing evaluation criteria based on the aims, selecting a 
decision-making tool, applying it to select a chosen alternative, and verifying the solution 
found to make sure it solves the problem [47]. 
For this work, it could be appropriate adapt the interpretation of decision-making concept 
as the process of selecting a course of action among several alternatives achieving a 
predetermined goal, choosing the one that will produce the most desirable benefits and the 
less unwanted consequences. This definition seems to be consistent with most of the 
concepts studied in the literature review and contains most elements needed to bring it 
within the context of this work. However, it also is important to follow the Baker`s model, 
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which involves the identification of the decision maker and stakeholder, reducing possible 
disagreements about problem definition, requirements, goals and criteria. [47] 
The efforts of this theoretical precision are concentrated on strategic management of LEAs 
when dealing with cybercrime. In this context, heads of these agencies are expected to 
play many roles in a case investigation; they must be better qualified to guide its 
collaborators and help to achieve their goals. However, it could not happen only following 
a series of steps; it might also be developing a set of attributes of leadership and human, 
conceptual, technical and personal skills, which allow managers to obtain the desired level 
of maturity and experience as an advantage in a high capacity for decision-making. 
In this regard, a generic crime scene could be viewed as a particular case of collaborative 
decision-making. Once the agency responsible for conducting the investigation is aware of 
the occurrence of cybercrime, they should express their interest and need to deal with it. 
The lead investigator might face the requirement to convoke a group of experts from 
different profiles that help to contribute to their knowledge and experience to understand 
and make traceability of the criminal activity presented. Then, leaders will face a scenario 
of decision-making, which implies the involvement of a vast number of individuals and 
groups that need to communicate with each other, by sharing information and taking 
decisions through many levels and limits. Also, according to the conditions and unique 
features of the nature of cybercrime treated in this study, decision-making have to deal 
with several variables such as management procedures, legal and procedural obstacles, 
privacy questions, trust issues, interest from partners, technical barriers, delays, or 
mandatory mechanisms, among others issues. 
Managers of LEA have to face the responsibility of failure or success in a cybercrime 
investigative case. The outcome will depend on the quality of the decisions taken, and how 
obstacles are overcome [31]. They must make smart and sound decisions while performing 
managerial functions such as planning, organizing, staffing, leading, and controlling [33].  
Sometimes they have to act under limited availability of time or resources, think under 
pressure, with low quality of information or using only their experience or intuition [34] 
[35]. The heads of LEA have to deal regularly with complex collaborative decision-
making in cybercrime cases, in determining what investigation practices or expertise has 
to be used to address the complexity of supporting teams. They have to evaluate the origin 
of the data and evidence, deciding how it could be assembled and correctly used in 
criminal investigations. Also, they have to determine who are responsible for establishing 
the scope and boundaries of the investigation, how to build a common language among 
forensic investigators to facilitate collaboration with each other and with other actors, and 
how to deal with logistics and negotiations [8].  
Organizational Interaction Mechanisms Combating Cybercrime 
Since the literature review evidenced the need of LEAs to implement mechanisms of 
collaboration, cooperation or information sharing in the fight against cybercrime, there is 
not sufficient clarity about the appropriate use of this terminology, and in some cases, it 
could overlap and confuse stakeholders when attempting to establish any collaborative 
mechanism. For this reason, it is important to make clarity of the meaning and scope of 
each of these concepts, to avoid indiscriminate use, employing appropriately terminology 
in what kind of mechanism is required and helping on the implementation of a common 
language for cybercrime investigations. 
In this regard, adopting the concept given in social sciences by Berger & Luckmann, the 
interaction could be interpreted as “The process by which people act and react in relation 
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to others. Partners agree on their goals, negotiate behaviour, distribute resources, and 
include activities such as exchange, competition, cooperation, conflict and coercion”[48]. 
The term organizational interaction could be appropriated on the delimitation of these 
three types of mechanisms, referring to any action that occurs among stakeholders, having 
an effect upon one another, and specifically for referring to the relationship of LEAs with 
stakeholders in which the object of this study is concentrated 
In this regard, the main interest of establishing organizational interaction mechanisms 
between stakeholders and LEAs is to achieve mutual benefits toward the investigative 
process. Managers could refer in applying to any of these mechanisms in specific 
requirements, depending on the context, purpose, and scope of each need of interaction. 
Collaboration applies when working alongside to achieve something. It is practicable 
when there is a jointly defined mission, shared goals, using shared resources and sharing 
mutual interests. By contrast, cooperation is achievable when interaction enables greater 
ability to perform activities, usually by providing information or resources that are limited 
in the investigative process. At the contrary of collaboration, there is not necessarily 
typically defined mission, goals are independent, and stakeholders use their resources 
pursuing private interests. Moreover, collaboration requires clear communication 
channels, longer commitment and involves cooperation to achieve its aims. Instead 
cooperation, it could be informal, limited in time, and it does not require collaboration in 
practice. Finally, authority and autonomy are retained by each organization in cooperation, 
so there is virtually no risk. Instead in collaboration, it is coordinated, and therefore, it has 
a higher risk. 
Information sharing was described as the good practice for the exchange of a cybercrime 
related information between trusted parts. The practice of doing it could be obtainable by 
sending and receiving tacit information to support the criminal investigation process. It 
could be accessible by disclosure, broadcast, sharing, and exchange of information, and 
the organizational interaction among stakeholders might occur in both collaboration and 
cooperation mechanisms.  
Figure	1.	Organizational	Interaction	Mechanisms	on	Cybercrime	Investigations	
The above figure summarizes the main features and differences in terminology related to 
the phenomenon under study. At the center, the three mechanisms explored in this section 
are located to denote to organizational interaction between LEAs and stakeholders for 
mutual benefits. The squares in front of each term refer to the description and differences 
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in the terminology studied. The differentiation and proper use of this terminology could 
allow stakeholders to apply precisely in establishing any of these mechanisms, avoiding 
confusion and delays in the provision of information or other resources. Moreover, by 
understanding the purpose and scope of each requirement, managers could get more 
benefits in improving information flows to help the cybercrime investigative process.  
4.2	Contextualization	of	the	Cybercrime	Field	Process	Analysis	
Identifying Cybercrime Stakeholders  
According to ENISA, investigators must act quickly and efficiently in the exchange of 
information, interacting with a broad range of stakeholders, promoting free flows of 
information and overcoming many legal, regulatory and operational obstacles [29]. But, as 
Brenner stated, in most cases cybercrime investigation competencies are exclusively 
reserved for law enforcement officers [39]. Therefore, the success of the investigation 
process on cybercrime investigations could be improved having clearly identified who are 
the most important players and what kind of information they can exchange. 
According to the Dutch experience, an upright stakeholder administration keeps track of 
the information needs and promotes relationships of trust among community members.  
This could be achieved with the establishment of clear rules, understanding interests from 
partners, and maintaining feedback trough reliable communication channels [12]. The 
Microsoft cybersecurity framework states that the evaluation of stakeholders requires the 
analysis of interests and needs of each actor, because they may have a variety of 
backgrounds, capabilities, skills and motivations, and the articulation of the unique needs 
is a fundamental part of building trust [28]. Martin & Rice have identified a broad range of 
stakeholders involved in various aspects of cybersecurity matters, including government, 
private critical infrastructure, business enterprises, IT companies, IT security firms and 
security researchers, among others. [28] To have a detailed view of the stakeholders in 
cybercrime investigations, this stakeholder analysis, could guide this work. The analysis 
also considered a broad range of actors including an extensive list of interested parties that 
could serve as a basis for understanding and manage organizational interaction needs 
regarding the phenomenon under study.  
Table 2 Cybercrime Investigation Stakeholders, adapted form Martin & Rice [49] 
CYBERCRIME STAKEHOLDERS 
Governmental 
organizations  
Ministries and state governments agencies. 
National Emergency response Team CERT 
Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies (Police cybercrime unit) 
International law enforcement agencies  
Prosecution or judicial authorities  
Federal legal and financial regulation agencies  
Federal and State Privacy Commissioners  
Military and National security organizations. 
National Intelligence agencies, community. 
Federal technology policy and regulation agencies 
International government organization  
Government business enterprise  
No Governmental 
organizations  
Information and technology special interest groups 
Financial industry special interest groups 
Not-for-profit businesses  
Tertiary level research centers (covering technology and law) 
Educational institutions/academy  
Public and private 
companies 
National Critical Infrastructures CI. 
Telecommunications and Internet service providers ISP 
Banking and Financial companies. 
Sectorial emergency response Teams CERT-s, CSIRT, SOC.  
Security software businesses enterprises 
Consulting businesses enterprises 
Individuals 
Individuals participating on Internet domain.  
Independent researchers. 
Citizens 
Victims/ witnesses  
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The above table compiles most of the stakeholders involved in cybercrime investigation 
processes. The first column titles the four broad categories, and the second list all of the 
interested parts involved in organizational interaction. This categorization is based on the 
mentioned study of Martin & Rice and complemented with other actors such as citizens, 
victims, witnesses, other cybercrime units and CERTs, considered relevant for LEAs [49]. 
Although all of the stakeholders related can be considered important for organizational 
interaction, this work only refers to the four main categories. 
Cybercrime Key Players Analysis  
For a complete overview on the current state of cybercrime and its perpetrators, it is 
important to identify who are the key players from the criminal perspective, determine 
their roles and how might they affect the stages of the investigative process. In this regard, 
considering the relevance of the analysis of attackers made by the ecrime project [35], it 
could be appropriate to integrate these elements in the study of the organizational 
interaction in cybercrime investigations. The study confirmed that crimes are usually 
perpetrated by hackers, former employees, organized criminal groups, current employees, 
customers, competitors, political and protest groups and terrorists. Cyber criminals have 
been analyzed, described and classified into four general types of players: International 
criminal organizations, foreign intelligence or states, legitimate organizations, and 
individuals or small groups. The outcomes of the investigation and its categorization could 
be visualized in the table 3.  
Table 3. Cybercrime Key Players, based on ecrime project [35]. 
PERPETRATORS DESCRIPTION 
International 
criminal 
organizations 
Organized 
Crime 
Highly qualified individuals specialized in the use of IT. 
Create or join to organized international crime. 
Generate incomes from illegal activities, or affect governments. 
Virtual 
criminal 
networks 
Specialized members (hacking, spamming, denial of service, etc.). 
Working separately and coordinated by a core member.  
Operating under a secret structure and strict rules. 
Using nicknames, forums, and not personal meetings. 
International 
hacker groups 
International crime with temporary affiliation.  
Promoting free flows of information, uncensored communications. 
Claiming invalidity of copyright, patenting and Internet surveillance. 
Foreign intelligence 
agencies, states 
Use of state intelligence agencies to perpetrate attacks against foreign governments. 
Targeting on intellectual property, awarding contracts, industrial or military 
espionage. It can be confused with cyberwarefare when criminal cyber hack ends 
and where some type of state or state-sponsored event begins. 
Legitimate 
organisations 
Institutions, organizations or private companies committing crimes such as  
IP theft, industrial espionage, etc., for increasing competitive advantages. 
Individuals and 
small criminal 
groups 
Perpetrators generally motivated for financial gain, paedophile, recreational or 
hacktivism purposes. Attacks may be planned or opportunistic. 
Sophistication depends on the resources. 
This summary of the key players is based on the ecrime project but adapted to this work 
according to the original analysis [35]. The very first column lists the categories of 
perpetrators. International criminal organizations are divided on three subcategories, and 
the last column describes behaviours, motivations and some examples of modus operandi 
of perpetrators. This categorization suggests that besides these categories, the actors not 
only act individually, and they can interact with each other. There is also a marked 
hierarchy according to their capacity of resources. While worldwide criminal 
organizations and states have greater resources, capacity to support and coordinate 
activities, they can control small criminal groups and individual hackers committing 
crimes. Also, each actor might have multiple affiliations to different criminal 
organizations and can play multiple roles simultaneously. Theses cases could indicate the 
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complexity of the investigation process in a large-scale criminal activity that could involve 
the efforts of many players at the same time.  
Cybercrime Ecosystem Analysis  
A full description of an entire ecosystem of cybercrime is a clue but a hard task, because 
of the complexity of actors, constant changes, and rapid evolution. However, the ecrime 
project has proposed a general guide identifying the key roles in cybercrime networks that 
could be used as a general guide for better understanding cybercrime spheres. The main 
factors affecting the ecosystem and criminal roles could be summarized as follows: 
Table 4. Criminal Roles on Cybercrime Ecosystem, based on ecrime project [35] 
FACTOR/PLAYER DESCRIPTION EXAMPLES 
Criminal Zero Individual or group that directly interfaces with victims. Primary beneficiary of the crime.  
Criminals, organized 
crime. 
Organized Crime and 
Black Market 
Criminals exchange products, goods, services, illegal 
content, tools, and traffic information. Generally by 
forums or encrypted and private messaging.  
Silk Road, Blackhole 
Exploit Kit, carder.su, etc. 
Criminal Service 
Providers 
Providers of illegal services, used by other criminals 
as proxies.  
Outsourced malware, DoS 
attacks. 
Developers Facilitators of specific and customized IT development services for perpetrating cybercrime.  
Tools, exploits, malware, 
botnets. 
Infrastructure 
Providers. 
IT providers, independent of conventional, 
facilitating and enabling cybercrime.  
Bulletproof hosting 
Monetization Service 
Providers 
Irregular service providers facilitating the delivery of 
goods and services traded by illegal activities. 
Extortion payments, mules.  
Victim 
Person or entity affected by cybercrime Individuals, organizations, 
Internet users.  Intermediate victim: used to attack the end victim.  
End victim: final target, ultimate goal of criminal 0. 
Corruption Occasional factor facilitating the perpetration or affecting efficiency of the investigation.  
Immorality, bribery, 
sabotages  
This summary table is based on the ecrime project study but adapted to this work 
according to the original analysis [35]. The first column lists the identified players or 
factors affecting the ecosystem; the second describes the structure, modus operandi, and 
the role of each player; and third, exemplifies cases and conducts to perform cybercrime. 
It is important to recognize that because of the complexity and constant changes of the 
ecosystem, the scenario may evolve, not all cases are identical, and not all factors could 
intervene in every case. This representation might be used as a general bases analysis, and 
not for any particular behaviour or a specific criminal. To achieve a deeper and detailed 
analysis, of organizational interaction, the factors should be adjusted to a concrete case or 
criminal network features, and recognizing what stage of the investigative process has 
affectation or would require intervention  
Cybercrime Cycle Analysis  
The purpose of describing cybercrime in an overall visual representation is to understand 
the sequence of operations that are performed to commit a crime. Through visualizing the 
cycle from the criminal side, the heads of LEAs could identify with precision what stage 
of the process may require intervention or resources by the stakeholders, understanding the 
whole structure and concentrating efforts on solving specific problems in the investigative 
process. According to the ecrime project, the resources required and the decisions taken in 
committing a crime could determine the modus operandi of cybercrime. The study of 
cybercrime cycle represents most of the cyber criminal behaviours from the perspective of 
the criminal side. The outcome of the study is a high-level journey map showing a broad 
spectrum of cybercrime acts that could be used as a basis for more detailed analysis in 
different typologies of crimes [35]. 
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The study has divided the cybercrime cycle in three main phases: The first, preparation 
includes pre-attack actions, initial decision, evaluating reconnaissance of target, value of 
attack, choosing a victim and attack methods. Criminals may use their own abilities, 
outsourcing services or buying solutions. The second, execution comprises the creation 
and implementation of a plan, interfacing with the target system and conducting criminal 
activities. And the third, monetization involves the payment, different modus operandi, 
and the way to get profit or personal gain. Although the report also mentioned the 
motivation factors affecting the cycle before the preparation, it was not considered by the 
project or this work, because it does not change the steps required to complete a crime. 
Table 5 Cybercrime Cycle, based on ecrime project [35] 
CYBERCRIME CYCLE DESCRIPTION  
Pr
ep
ar
at
io
n Market research, taking the decision, evaluating 
opportunity, weighing costs 
and benefits. Choosing a 
victim, the method and 
deciding to execute  
Using own means or abilities Botnet, malware or exploit  
Acquiring from another 
criminal. 
Seller, broker, deal-breaker, developer or 
programmer 
Crime as a service: hiring a 
outsourcing service 
By specific forums, markets and online 
stores. 
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
Conducting the attack plan 
Gaining access to victim 
resources 
By using malware, drive-by downloads, 
user actions, etc. 
Mapping the compromised 
network Deploying additional malware 
Interacting with the target 
system and taking actions 
Hacked PC: taking over for illegal 
activities 
M
on
et
iz
at
io
n 
Materialization of 
payments in four ways 
Victim pays to Criminal Zero 
directly 
Extortion, ransomware, or DDoS extortion 
schemes 
Victim resources are turned to 
tangible assets Trade, sale or purchase of assets.  
Criminal Zero pays for ordered 
services or goods to another 
criminal 
Real money, crypto currency, re-sellable, 
money equivalents (i.e. gaming assets). 
Goods and services (real or virtual, legal 
or illegal).  
Buying and/or bartering other goods and 
services 
Using laundering services, mules.  
Criminal Zero access to victim 
resources Personal gain  
This summary table is based on the ecrime project study and adapted to this work 
according to original analysis [35]. The very first column lists the three main phases of the 
cycle; the second describes the activities performed by criminals to conduct each phase; 
the third   includes the description of how criminals obtain the expected results; and fourth 
includes examples to illustrate the materialization of the crime. Although the original 
purpose of this study is to analyze the economic impact of non-Information and 
Telecommunications Technology (non-ICT) sector, this can be considered an important 
tool to visualize how it affects the entire ecosystem. It also could help to understand the 
nature of needs and the current state of organizational interaction during cybercrime 
investigations.  
Current State of the Organizational Interaction During Cybercrime Investigations 
Due to the complex structure of the cybercrime development, the ecrime project has 
focussed efforts on an exhaustive and detailed analysis of several aspects, structures and 
stages of cybercrime from different angles. The study describes the economic effects of 
cybercrime in the non-ICT sector, identifying taxonomy and inventories, evaluating 
counter-measures and mapping cybercrime journeys, to develop measures and methods to 
deter criminals and limit their actions [35]. Given that this project has collected valuable 
sources of information from the literature, and has developed a recognized great 
contribution in building information to combat cybercrime, it is appropriate to take it as a 
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reference for the phenomenon under analysis and for the purposes of this work. 
To represent a general idea of the cybercrime ecosystem interrelations and understand its 
current state, this study has compiled most of the elements considered throughout this 
work, with the intention to present a reliable current state of organizational interaction 
during cyber-crime investigations. With graphical representations of key cyber players, 
stakeholders, cybercrime cycle, and understanding the cybercrime ecosystem; it can be 
obtained necessary elements for future analysis and evaluation of any problem related to 
cybercrime.  Moreover, by mapping these elements, managers of LEAs, or anyone 
interested in making improvements to the investigative process, could get a holistic view 
of the phenomenon and propose solutions to strengthen weaknesses where more attention 
is required. 
 
Figure 2. Cybercrime Ecosystem Interrelations, adapted from ecrime project [35]. 
The above figure is based on the extensive work of the ecrime project and the analysis of 
organizational interaction studied in this work [35]. This represents an advance for 
understanding the current state of organizational interaction ad the interrelations on the 
cybercrime ecosystem. In this regard, cybercrime comprehends diverse criminal activities 
where computers and information systems are involved and undertake many factors and 
elements described as follows. The figure includes the four principal groups of elements: 
Stakeholders, perpetrators, the cybercrime ecosystem, and the cybercrime cycle. On the 
left side are the stakeholders, represented in this figure as the victims, which were 
explained and described in this section in table 2. On the right side are the perpetrators, 
which also were studied on in this section and summarized in table 3. The factors and 
players affecting the cybercrime ecosystem were explained in Table 4, they are located at 
the center of the figure, and represent the criminal interactions to attack a victim and 
commit a crime. Finally, the perpetrator conducts activities to commit a crime through a 
perpetration cycle compound by the phases of preparation, execution, and monetization 
explained of table 5. The graphical representation summarizes the most critical 
components and the interrelation of these elements within the cycle and the ecosystem. It 
also provides valuable components for facilitating the analysis, contextualization, 
classification and categorization of the phenomenon under study. This material could be 
considered as a guide to help to understand the problems associated with the investigation 
process and its stages, obtaining a broader view for solving specific problems, and in 
particular, for identifying challenges and needs faced by decision makers of LEAs. 
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5 Practical	Applications	
This section describes the analytical sequence that leads to the weaknesses and 
intervention needs’ identification in five stages. Five of the most representative types of 
investigation processes that depart from diverse perspectives will be compared first. Then, 
an optimized investigation analysis model, based on needs of organizational interaction, 
will be proposed. Next, the work will present a compilation of the collaboration, 
cooperation and information sharing needs of LEAs. Besides, the Colombian case study 
on organizational interaction will be introduced. Finally, how the perspectives studied in 
this work may apply is illustrated with a set of guidelines and best practices for the 
enhancement of the investigative process. 
5.1 Modelling	of	Cybercrime	Investigation	Process	
Acording to Roger & Achille, no clearly defined or standardized process for cybercrime 
investigations exist, or consensus on the definition of tasks to be developed for 
investigators at each stage of the processes [50]. It is also evident that among the 
procedures some proactive and reactive activities must be carried out to obtain evidence 
before to bringing a case before the court and to support prosecution.  Despite multiple 
attempts to adopt an existing model, no instance seemed applicable to the objectives of 
this work. Models vary depending on specific contextual factors such as technical and 
regulatory scenarios. At the same time, there are enough similarities (not to mention 
principles and doctrines of universal observance such as the rule of law) to warrant an 
attempt to conceptualize a more general scheme.  
By comparing different models of the detection of successful investigation requirements is 
facilitated. The identification of the steps that necessitate the most efforts on issues related 
to organizational interactions helps in turn the task of underlining possible intervention 
spots because weaknesses affecting decision making converge there. Without discarding 
the merits of other methodologies, formulated according to the needs and peculiarities of 
each investigation process, commonalities are picked from the following five consolidated 
types: Casey proposes an exhaustive model applied for managing digital forensic analysis 
on mobile and computer networks, dividing the process into 12 steps but emphasizing on 
the stages of acquisition, analysis and reporting [51]. Meanwhile, Lee does not discuss 
rather the full investigative process but marks four steps of the crime scene management: 
recognition, identification, individualization, and reconstruction [52] The first Digital 
Forensics Research Workshop (DFRW) proposes a 7 steps linear model for digital 
forensic analysis, developed for military, civilian, and law enforcement purposes, which is 
well known and used widely as a standard framework [53]. Mandia & Prosise, propose a 
model of incident response investigation procedures, focusing on management and quick 
containment of security incidents, business processes, and recovery, also consisting of 
seven steps [54]. A summary of the comparative exercise is summarized in table 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Table 6. Comparison of Cybercrime Investigation Models 
  Roger Casey DFRW Lee Mandia 
  
Proactive, active 
and reactive 
activities analysis. 
Digital forensic analysis 
management 
Forensic Linear 
process analysis. 
Physical crime scene Incident response model 
PR
E
 
Alert 
Accusation or Incident Alert  
    
Pre incident preparation. 
Detection of incidents  
Assessment of Worth 
(prioritization) 
Initial response 
Formulate response 
strategy 
A
N
A
L
Y
SI
S 
Identification 
Incident/Crime Scene 
Protocols (Activities on 
scene) 
Identification Recognition Data collection 
Collection Identification or Seizure (recognition) Preservation Documentation,  
Search for and identify 
evidence  
Preservation.  Preservation (integrity) Collection Collection Collection of evidence  
Analysis Recovery (hidden, deleted)   Preservation  Transport of evidence  
  Harvesting (data) 
Examination  
Identification 
classification and 
comparison 
Storage of evidence  
  Reduction (Filter, eliminate) 
  
Organization and Search 
(focus)  
Analysis (scrutinize) 
Analysis  
Individualization, link 
analysis, evaluation 
and interpretation 
Data analysis 
PO
ST
 Documentation Reporting (detailed record) Presentation 
Reconstruction, 
leading reporting and 
presentation 
Reporting 
  Persuasion and Testimony (explanation)       
The compilation was drafted by compiling the five representative models of the 
investigative process marked on the first row by the name of the proponent. The column to 
the left shows the 3 classifications of the stages.  According to the moment where the 
procedure takes place these are the preparatory, analytical, and posterior stages. The row 
below the perspective’s name designates the nature and objectives of each model type. 
From the text analysis of the terminology contained in the documents describing the 
models it can be can be seen that, although each model type meets specific requirements, 
was developed based on different methodologies and pertains a variety of activities, the 
categories of steps (pre, analysis, and post) could be applied. In addition, for assessment 
purposes, this way of systematization is simple and yet very useful to organize the 
sequences and patterns involved. All models at least imply preparatory activities 
(including the prearranged) that take place before the crime is noticed or alerted. Lead 
investigators perform planning activities when allocating resources and tools for the 
investigation, and the identification of potential sources of evidence. Next, investigators 
acquire and collect sources of evidence, preserving and preventing changes. Then, the 
evidence is analyzed, interpreted and traced, by using protocols, methodologies, and 
techniques and data interpretation tools. A final report communicates the results of the 
analysis and a decision. Later, after the forensic process has reached an end, continuous 
improvement and monitoring and control activities begin to happen. Blank spaces in the 
table show the steps that are missing from some of the model types.  
The model proposed by Roger includes most of the components, incorporating a 
multidimensional-perspective. It summarizes the process in six stages of investigation 
considering the reactive, active and proactive phases and a set of activities on each stage. 
However, this model does not include the managerial elements that could be contained in 
the preparatory stage before the crime is noticed, nor after the delivery of the final report. 
For the purposes of this work, it will be necessary to explore the incorporation of these 
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new elements that could be essential to the analysis of needs of organizational interaction 
on cybercrime investigation levels.  
5.2 Optimized	Cybercrime	Investigation	Model	
The aim of this model is not to discuss the effectiveness and appropriateness of existing 
models but to propose a sample or model of cybercrime investigation based on the needs 
of interaction with stakeholders and not merely on the procedural steps that are established 
by procedural laws, regulations and practices. This model expands the considerations 
towards strategic management domains where organizational interaction elements play an 
important role. Hence, aspects related to schemes of organizational interaction will be 
added, allowing more uses, for instance, the prioritization of efforts in the process stages 
that require intervention, and the enhancement of flows of information between certain 
stakeholders. The resulting stages, descriptions and activities developed in each stage are 
indicated in Table 7. 
Table 7. Optimized Model of Cybercrime Investigation, based on Roger’s [50] 
  STAGE DESCRIPTION ACTIVITIES 
1 Preparation 
Strategic activities for planning, 
management and control the 
investigation process.  
Founding clear objectives, specific, measurable, verifiable and achievable, according to the 
available resources. 
Identification of legal and procedural framework, barriers and obstacles. 
Training planning on forensic investigation techniques, legal procedures, use of ICT, acquiring 
knowledge and skills. 
Recognizing and evaluation available resources of cooperation. 
Establishing policies, plans and procedures to support collaboration and cooperation schemes to 
facilitate the exchange of information on the investigative process. 
Provision plan of resources and technical tools. 
2 Alert 
The process is activated with a 
complaint, alert, detection or 
notification. A management plan is 
developed according to risk and 
internal policies 
Identify case regulations. 
Determine the assessment of worth. 
Incident confirmation. 
Obtain an authorization. 
Obtain a search warrant.  
Determine a containment strategy. 
Formulate an investigation plan. 
Coordinate the resources. 
Accelerate the investigation. 
Notification of the investigation.  
3 Identification 
Identification of possible sources of 
evidence, data and clues are 
prioritized and evaluated. 
Identify data in the order of volatility 
Prioritization according to specific requirements 
Hostile and outstanding behaviours are also selected and catalogued. 
Identify all the electronic equipment used by the suspect. 
Identify and protect fragile evidence from plugging of the power cable.  
Obtain the maximum information from people present in the scene.  
Prevent form violating the jurisdictional laws and corporate policies.  
Classifying victims, suspects, bystanders, witnesses, etc. 
4 Collection 
Evidence acquisition or live 
collection of identified data and 
unusual behaviours, in a form which 
can be preserved and analysed 
Choosing collection equipment or automated tools. 
Imaging storage devices, hard disks or seizure of entire computers. 
Collection of volatile evidence. 
Evaluating according to a specific situation. 
Capturing, recording, analysing network audit trails, discovering the source of security 
breaches or other information assurance problems 
5 Preservation 
Evidence collected is preserved and 
located in a safe place, ensuring of 
tempering, integrity, authentication, 
transportation, storage, 
documentation.     
Applying hashing methods and tools to preserve evidence. 
Electronic devices must be photographed with all of the accessories 
What is appearing on the screen should also be documented 
A record of all visible data must be created. 
Establish "police line" to protect evidence of damaged cybercrime scene. 
6 Analysis 
Evaluating if evidence constitutes 
sufficient information for the 
reconstruction of the incident or it is 
in line with hypothesis.  
Automated tools and forensic technics to analyse data (data mining) 
Revisit the investigation plan. 
Brief reconstruction of the case. 
Review the relevance of tools and expertise available. 
Develop the hypothesis. 
Analyze the evidence. 
Test the hypothesis. 
Make a finding. 
Validate the results of analysis. 
Documenting and securing activities 
Document the case 
7 Report Documentation and detailed report of findings. 
Presentation of findings and probable cause to court or authorities. 
Reveal the root-cause  
8 Post-Investigation 
Monitoring and control of activities 
post processing  
Translation and explanation 
Legal assistance on post crime process procedure 
Control and supervision by third parts 
Successfully prosecute a perpetrator 
Retraining and feedback 
Continuous improvement  
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The proposed optimization is based on Roger’s multidimensional perspective six step 
model but unlike his, the investigative process distribution consists of eight phases that are 
numbered and listed in the first two columns to the left of the table [50]. The third column 
describes the phases functionally, and the fourth operationally, listing the activities that 
each phase comprises. To reduce the complexities associated with the different instances 
and operations required to complete the investigation process, organizational interaction or 
the schemes of collaboration; cooperation; and sharing information have to be 
implemented, involving all stakeholders identified in section 4.2, and grouped in Table 2. 
Figure 3 proposes a visualized description of the need for organizational interaction during 
cybercrime investigation arises and should take place.  
 
Figure 3. Organizational Interaction needs during Cybercrime Investigation Processes 
The investigation process is at the center of the figure, surrounded by the stakeholders that 
in turn participate and interact during the eight stages located and listed in the circles. 
Placed the outer square are the needs grouped in the categories that are explained in 
section 5.3. The arrows show the mechanisms that correspond to the phenomenon of 
organizational interaction. All the components that appear in the figure are fundamental 
parts of the whole, not isolation, if to think of strategic decision-making and other 
managerial responsibilities such as planning and monitoring, within cybercrime 
investigations. 
 To assess the effectiveness of the optimized model is not a task of this thesis and falls 
beyond its scope. In fact the models that are available in the literature do not get statistical 
validation but are acceptable or not based on how sound the assumptions they put forward 
are and when they become accepted by practitioners and institutionalized in time. 
However, measurements on performance can be obtained under a different research design 
when enough information on its application can be collected. A construct for quantitative 
analysis based on empirical data is a promising option to support improvements in 
investigative processes, and would complement the model in the longer run. 
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5.3 Analysis	of	Needs	During	Cybercrime	Investigation	Processes	
The general purpose of this section is the application of the optimized model for the 
analysis of needs of managers or LEAS during cybercrime investigation processes. In 
particular those concerned with collaboration, cooperation and information sharing. An 
extensive list of +100 needs collected and compiled from the academic literature, reports 
from ENISA and HTCIA was grouped according to their similarity on one hand and in an 
original categorization on the other. The resulting list contains 41 needs within four 
categories as presented in Table 8. 
The application of the model seeks first, to identify the most pressing needs, meaning the 
most urgent. Second, the most recurrent, recognizing the frequency in which the needs 
arise. All of the above performed within the context of higher-level spheres. Additionally, 
the application of the model will allow managers to spot the stages of the process where 
organizational interaction is the most required or/and problematic and may require 
intervention. The work is also concerned on how to categorize the type of needs required, 
and how it fits according to the terminology adopted in this study.  
The results of an analysis of needs based on this optimized model should persuasively 
indicate the importance of considering a model of cybercrime investigation based on the 
needs of interaction with stakeholders. It allowed the proposal of two stages that are 
ordinarily disregarded where the impact of prioritizing efforts would be the most 
beneficial. The establishment of the necessary conditions to facilitate the implementation 
and practice of the mechanisms of organizational interaction: collaboration, cooperation 
and sharing information among stakeholders cannot guarantee the success of an 
investigative process  
Table 8 shows the summary of needs and the analysis made based on the proposed model. 
It includes the categorized needs, the stages of the investigative process and the 
organizational interactions interrelations. The sources of information were taken from the 
literature review, mainly from ENISA works 2010-2013, 2015 [6], [11], [29], [30], [40]; 
HTCIA 2010, 2011 [41] [43]; Gercke 2011, 2012 Brown [5]; [1] [36]; ITU  [7]; PERF  
[9]; Broadhurst [10]; and Berdnar 2008 [8].  
  
32 
 
Table  8 Categorization of the needs of interaction on cybercrime investigations processes 
ST
A
G
E
S 
 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES LEA’s NEEDS 
PR
E
 
A
L
E
R
T
 
ID
E
N
T
 
C
O
L
L
E
C
T
 
PR
E
SE
R
V
 
A
N
A
L
Y
SI
S 
R
E
PO
R
T
 
PO
ST
 
Σ 
St
ag
es
 
C
O
L
L
A
B
 
C
O
O
PE
 
IN
F 
SH
A
R
E
 
Σ 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
M
A
N
A
G
E
R
IA
L
 
1. Administration of management procedures, models or standards for collaboration success. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 3 
2. Improving trust relationships, reducing difficulties getting a return from stakeholders. 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 3 
3. Avoid and prevent communication breakdown between strategic, technical and operational 
levels. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 1 0 0 1 
4. Avoid and prevent conflict of interests. 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 1 1 3 
5. Avoid resistance due to the imposition of mandatory reporting. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 
6. Promotion regular face to face meetings for exchange experiences, ideas and knowledge 
about methods, processes, and techniques relating to investigations and security in advanced 
technologies in the field of cybercrime 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 
7. Clarify information sharing policies, common benefits and goals among stakeholders 
community. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 
8. Avoid and prevent excessive workload. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 
9. Recognition and support from international community and counterparts.  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 
10. Promoting voluntary mechanisms instead mandatory, preventing wastage of efforts in 
formal agreements. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 
11. Cooperation agreements with specific stakeholders (GOs, NGOs, courts, abuse teams, 
ISPs, security service providers, independent researchers, malware repositories, hosting 
providers, network operators, among others) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
12. Benefits of getting memberships to associations and organizations in the field.  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
13. Promotion of cross-border law enforcement cooperation and Public–Private Partnership 
(PPP). 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
PR
O
C
E
D
U
R
A
L
 
14. Simplification of procedures and bureaucratic requirements in prosecutions, and digital 
forensics interrogations. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 3 
15. Prevent and avoid providing erroneous information to divert or intentionally misleads the 
course of the investigation 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 1 1 3 
16. Provision of related information with responsibilities and ownership for IT Resources (IP 
addresses and URLs) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 1 1 3 
17. Standardization on terminology reducing language barriers. 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 2 
18. Access to privileged information (Intelligence sources, according to domestic and 
international legal settlements 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 3 
19. Reduction of loss of quality of information or CIA proprieties of the data collected. 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 3 
20. Inclusion of control and supervision from communications regulatory authorities or 
collectively by industry. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 3 
21. Open access to IoC Indicators of Compromise from specialized stakeholders  1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 
22. Provision of automatic mechanisms for exchange of data. 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 
23. Regularity of flows of information with stakeholders. 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 
24. Provision of secure platform of communication channels. 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 
25. Prevention and reduction of exposure to loss of reputation due to sharing sensitive 
information. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 
26. Avoid legal pitfalls on data exchange 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 
27. Protection of disruption or contamination of evidence in the chain of custody 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 
28. Access to mandatory reporting in accordance with current and local regulations. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 
29. Timely processing requests for mutual legal assistance and supply of information 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 
E
D
U
 /T
E
C
H
N
IC
A
L
 30. Optimized and up to date tools to support investigations and reports. 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 1 0 0 1 31. Provision of technical tools: web portal or incident repositories, avoiding proliferation of 
communication channels. 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 
32. Assistance in process of information gathering and preparation of cases in court. 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 
33. Assistance on criminal investigations, providing expert testimony, collection or exchange 
evidentiary data. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 
34. Assistance on conducting international cases, joint investigations, and coordinated 
responses. 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 3 
35. Assistance on post-processing crimes procedures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 
36. Education, training in forensic investigation techniques, legal procedures, use of ICT, 
knowledge and skills. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 
L
E
G
A
L
 
37. Reduction of legal obstacles on delivery of information and privacy issues, 
harmonization on data protection law. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 1 1 1 3 
38. Reduction of restrictions in a formal legal mandate for reporting crimes. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 
39. Legal assistance on complaints or questions for sharing sensitive information, data 
protection and privacy issues. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 
40. Legal assistance on jurisdictional issues associated to cross border gathering evidence 
and cloud computing. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 
41. Legal framework that establishes commitments and obligations for private sector parties 
to cooperate with LEA’s. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 
 
TOTAL 29 11 22 9 8 6 10 9 
 
22 29 27 
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The first row designates the name of the columns where the first title is on the 
categorization of needs; the second on the concrete needs; from the third to the tenth the 
title indicates the stages of the model; the eleventh shows the total of times that a need 
repeats across the modelled process (recurrence); titles twelve to fourteen refers to the 
organizational interaction type (collaboration, cooperation or information sharing); and, 
the fifteen show the total of interaction types that each given need would require. In the 
rows below from the second to the forty-first are the categories of needs that are called: 
managerial, procedural, technical and educational, and legal, according to their salient 
commonalities. On the following column the summarized list of needs that were reduced 
from +100 to 41 that the next eight columns will recognize as appearing or not on each of 
the stages of the modelled process. These slots on stages are valued with “1” when 
organizational interaction needs are detected, or “0” when otherwise. Some of the needs 
might have impact in various stages simultaneously. The total of results is shown in the 
column that follows immediately (“∑Stages”). The three columns that are next refer to the 
type of mechanisms that are the most needed or typify the interaction, and the last show 
the total of these that can be also coincide in the case of some needs (“∑Mechanisms”).  
To restate, from the completion of this analysis, each necessity is assessed and classified 
within the established concepts of collaboration, cooperation and sharing information that 
should correspond to certain mechanisms of action (they are not specified on this section). 
Then, it is determined at which stage of the modelled investigative process the need 
compromises most or impacts management functions and responsibilities. It is observable 
on the table that a need could be perceived and therefore has impact on one or more stages 
of the process, depending on how pressing the need for interaction with stakeholders may 
be. Most of the requirements that investigators and managers are facing come from the 
preliminary and identification stages (having obtained 29 and 22 implications respectively, 
as shown in the row of totals at the bottom of the table), which are two added to the list by 
Roger [50], and these correspond to cooperation and sharing information needs, with a 
lower impact on the rest of the stages. The findings support the advantages of this model 
and the practical value of its formulation, because the most pressing and recurrent needs, 
and the stages where intervention is warranted become visible and can be acted upon. 
Totals, however, do not necessarily mean that some needs may be of greater or lesser 
importance in a specific stage, the relevance of such categorization indicates that all 
identified needs are a fundamental part of the organizational interaction phenomenon, but 
most of these correspond to activities for strategic planning, management and monitoring 
the investigative process.  
The analysis illustrated on the table evidenced that most of the organizational interactions 
gaps and weaknesses correspond to strategic activities for planning, management and 
monitoring the investigation process. This also indicates that if decision-makers acted on 
this information, they could handle these deficiencies early in the processes, namely, from 
the preparatory stage. Improved organizational interaction mechanisms could encourage 
the establishment of necessary conditions to facilitate the investigation of cybercrime.  The 
following ideas are sample corrective tactics that should be applied to the intervention of 
the preparation stage, the most affected according to the analysis and where the 
managerial actions can have greater impact, in the shortest period of time: 
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1. The need number 1 could be resolved by developing management procedures, models 
or standards for organizational interaction since early stages of the investigative 
process. The strategies should intend to simplify procedures and bureaucratic 
requirements to cyber crime investigations, prosecutions, and digital forensics 
interrogations, reducing legal obstacles on the delivery of information, harmonizing 
data protection law, and privacy issues; 
2. The need number 2 could be contented by promoting and establishing reliability in the 
investigative process. Trusted relationships among stakeholder community might 
avoid legal pitfalls on data exchange and decrease difficulties to getting a better 
return. 
3. The need number 3 could be prevented by including secure platforms of 
communication channels that allow the provision of automatic mechanisms for 
exchange data, prevent and reduce loss the of reputation risks due to sharing sensitive 
information. The provision of technical tools (web portal or incident repositories, 
avoiding proliferation of communication channels), and the standardization of 
terminology, could reduce obstacles and language barriers on organizational 
interaction mechanisms; 
4. The need number 4 could be overcome by clarifying organizational interaction 
mechanisms. However, improving trust relationships could require long-term 
strategies to increase reliability in processes and reduce conflicts of interest in 
stakeholders; 
5. For needs 5 and 10, it would be necessary to evaluate the convenience of voluntary 
reporting instead mandatory, reducing restrictions in a formal legal mandate rather 
than mandatory, and preventing waste of efforts in establishing formal agreements 
with specific stakeholders;  
6. The need number 6 could be meet by the promotion of regular face to face meetings, 
exchange of experiences, ideas, and knowledge about methods, processes, and 
techniques relating to investigations and security in advanced technologies in the field 
of cybercrime; 
7. The need number 7 by the clarification of information sharing policies, emphasizing 
on shared benefits of shared goals among stakeholders community, it could improve 
flows of information on cybercrime investigations. 
8. The need number 8 by developing strategies for proper management of human 
resources, prioritizing cases and avoiding excessive workload of investigators. 
9. For needs   9 and 12, the development of a positioning strategy to obtain recognition 
and support from international community and counterparts could be considered, 
accentuating on benefits of getting memberships to associations and organizations in 
the field of cybercrime. 
10. The need number 11, requires cooperation agreements with Governmental and no 
Governmental Organizations, public and private companies, individuals, in regional, 
local or international organizations and specialized agencies. (Courts, abuse teams, 
ISPs, security service providers, independent researchers, malware repositories, 
hosting providers, network operators, among others).  
11. The need number 13 by the Promotion of cross-border law enforcement cooperation 
and Public–Private Partnership (PPP). It may include control and supervision 
procedures from communications regulatory authorities or collectively by industry. 
35 
 
5.4 Organizational	 Interaction	within	 the	Colombia	Cybercrime	Centre	
CCP	
The “Centro Cibernetico Policial de la Policia Nacional de Colombia”, also known as 
DIJIN CCP, is the Colombian Cybercrime Center Unit. It is one of two investigative 
institutions established to conduct investigations and therefore an intended audience for 
the work henceforth contained. The unit belongs to the National Police, a greater structure 
where the CCP is ascribed.  The legal framework on cyber security in place includes legal 
texts and public policy documents. The most important for the purposes of this section can 
be said to be. The National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) called  “Lineamientos Para la 
Politica de Ciberseguridad y Ciberdefensa CONPES” which correspond to the National 
Planning Policy Guidelines on Cybersecurity and Cyberdefense” CONPES 3701/2011. In 
April of the present year, a new set of guidelines is to be issued and into place receiving 
the name “Politica Nacional de Seguridad Nacional” CONPES 3854/2016.14 These 
documents are developed to meet the global challenges on cybersecurity while attending 
to the needs and requirements of the country. In the NCSS of Colombia issues cooperation 
are pointed out through the incorporation of priorities for implementing the appropriate 
institutions, providing training and strengthening legislation and international cooperation. 
National guidelines have represented the most advanced lean towards collaboration and 
cooperation at the initiative of the government. These clarify of roles and assign the 
responsibilities of the main stakeholders, and include essential managerial mechanisms of 
interaction as the ones discussed in this work, to support the fight against cybercrime. The 
objectives and guidelines of the NCSS of Colombia regarding linked to the phenomenon 
of organizational interaction mechanisms to facilitate the work of investigation and 
prosecution of cybercrimes can be summarized as follows. (The original document is in 
Spanish) [55].  
1. The section IV, in pg. 20-23 and paragraphs A and B, are relevant to managers 
because it refers to the identification and recognition of the existing local and 
international regulations. The document adopts terminology and the establishment 
of bodies for effective and efficient prevention, investigation and prosecution of 
cybercrime; 
2. The section A, in pg. 10-14, refers to the national existing initiatives regarding 
cooperation and collaboration between the government and all levels of the private 
sector. Paragraph 9 marks ways to deter cybercrime, recommending the 
implementation and development of legal frameworks related to cybersecurity that 
are consistent with international standards. It gives recommendations for the 
development of response systems, including monitoring and analysis and proposes 
guidelines for the implementation of a national culture of cybersecurity to improve 
levels of protection of information of the Critical National Infrastructure; 
3. The section 3, in pg. 17, recognizes high levels of vulnerability and awareness with 
the increase of Internet users, critical infrastructure interdependencies, national 
electronic media, proliferation of incidents and crimes risks, threats and the 
persistence of impunity for handling such crimes. Managers should be responsive 
to the current situation to justify the need for organizational interaction; 
                                                
14 During the last weeks of the completion of this work, the new public policy document was released and 
became available on  11.04.2016 https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Económicos/3854.pdf 
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4. In section d in pg. 25-27, the Police Cyber Center – CCP, is given a mandate with 
responsibilities in combating cybercrime within the national territory. It must for 
example offer information, support and protection against cybercrime by 
preventing, investigating and prosecuting computer crimes in the country, 
attending national guidelines and working in coordination with ColCERT and the 
Cybernetics Joint Command CCoC (Military); 
5. The section 3 in pg. 19 paragraphs 3 recognizes regulatory weaknesses about data 
protection. Although there are legal and regulatory instruments, there are 
shortcomings that impede timely response to incidents and cybercrime; 
6. The section B pg. 14 identifies the need of strengthening the legal framework to 
advance international cooperation and the accession of Colombia to various 
international instruments such as the Convention of the Council of Europe on 
Cybercrime (Budapest Convention). Managers could obtain benefits for judicial 
cooperation and extradition, adding to 24/7 point of contact, access to storage, and 
supply of logs by ISPs to facilitate investigations; 
7. The establishment of the need to design and implement training plans regarding 
cybersecurity, investigation and prosecution of computer crimes to judicial police, 
judges and prosecutors and final users that page 18 contains under guideline 2 b 
concerns managerial activities; 
8. Weaknesses on ISPs, regulations were recognized and discussed. For example in 
section 3 and page 19, describes the lack of policies to share information to 
authorities. Although these companies were obliged to implement security models 
to improve the security of their access networks, managers face difficulties for 
clear policies, storage and supply of information and logs in the fight against 
cybercrime; 
9. If Colombia faces the challenge of positioning itself as a regional leader in the area 
of cybersecurity through sharing of best practices, knowledge, and experiences, 
with particular attention to the promotion of national expertise in the development 
process of the policy of cyber security and defense, cooperation, collaboration and 
sharing of information may be configured. In page 28 section 3 the text says that 
leaders and experts will participate in lectures, workshops, and specialized 
meetings; 
Despite progress to achieve the objectives of this initiative, the period of validity have 
ended in 2014 and only at this time the national government is advancing efforts to 
develop a new strategy. However, given the complexity and evolution of cybercrime, other 
recent initiatives have been presented for incorporating mechanisms of interaction. For 
example, the creation of a high-level committee led by the Ministers of Defense; Justice; 
and Information Technology and Communications, to strengthen the existing policies and 
adapt to the challenges posed by technological advances and threats in cyberspace. The 
current cooperation mechanisms were activated convoking national government, internal 
cybersecurity agencies, Organization of American States OAS, World Economic Forum 
WEF 15, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD, and the 
Council of Europe and Interpol [56]. 
Online Survey  
                                                
15 Accesible on: https://www.weforum.org/global-challenges/projects/cybercrime/ 
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This work sought to find support from experts in considerations regarding the relevance 
and importance of organizational interaction mechanisms. Collecting information on these 
respects supports both research questions and the assumptions developed in the conceptual 
section of the thesis, it relates in particular to the research task 8. An online survey was 
distributed to obtain empirical data that could reaffirm the findings illustrated in Table 8 
on the analysis of needs applied to the optimized modelling proposal explained in Table 7 
and illustrated in Figure 3. The main finding to corroborate was the prevalence of certain 
organizational interaction weaknesses due to their urgency and recurrence and whether the 
expert group consulted coincided with the results. .  
A survey was conducted including a questionnaire of 9 closed and one open question that 
asked about level of criticality (urgency and recurrence) of the organizational interaction 
needs that the Colombia National Police faces during cybercrime investigations. The 
questions referred to the most representative needs from the four categories taking into 
account the number of stages where they appear and the amount of mechanisms involved 
from the corresponding totals on Table 8. 
The survey was administered in Spanish, the official language of the country, and then 
translated for this report into English. A convenience group was requested to participate 
based on expertise, occupation and ease of reach.  The invitation was sent online to 90 
officials from the National Police Cybercrime Unit DIJIN-CCP from Colombia, which 
forms its entire staff at the headquarters in Bogota. The group is in charge of 
administrative, operational, investigative and decision-making roles and responsibilities 
within the process of investigation of cybercrime in the country. The officials belong to 
different investigative groups according to the internal structure of the cybercrime center. 
The responsibilities and tasks of the investigative process are distributed in the groups of 
combating child pornography, financial crimes, cyber terrorism, critical infrastructure 
protection, forensic laboratory, citizen services (CAI Virtual), management and support.  
The instrument was emailed to the corporate accounts of each of the officials directly. All 
potential participants were informed on the aim and nature of the survey and were asked 
about their perception of what are the major impediments, obstacles and requirements that 
criminal investigation process face regarding collaboration and efficient delivery and 
timely information by third parties in the investigation of cybercrime at the Colombia 
National Police. The answers to the questions posed were evaluated by respondents on a 
scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest value and 5 the maximum.  One additional open 
question was formulated in order to obtain detailed information of the requirements that 
could not be contained in the questionnaire. The data collected and summary of results 
remains accessible online16, a report is also attached to the appendix section.  
Results description:  40 officials from the group of 90 responded the questionnaire. It 
represents a significant sample of 44% of the total base, sufficiently distributed among the 
different responsibilities represented, allowing significant collection of information. 75% 
of respondents execute operative and investigative roles; 15% perform administrative 
tasks such as management of resources and training, and 10% develop planning and 
control activities for decision-making. The summary of results and analysis for questions 1 
to 9 can be visualized in the following figure 4. 
                                                
16  Accesible on : https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1-Vg8QXexWHBIoycIVRuKs7KVSanR5yTD48CBmy-
OiyA/edit?usp=drive_web 
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Figure 4 Summary of results indicating level of criticality. 
Figure 4 summarizes the results of organizational interaction needs criticality evaluated by 
the respondents, and should be interpreted as follows: the list on left side represents the 
issues of importance that were reflected in questions formulated and listed from 1 to 9 
(each corresponding to the nine most representative needs of the 41 that were categorized 
in table 8), while on the horizontal axis at the top the level of criticality of each matter is 
shown, as scored by the participants. The evaluation scale ranged from 1 to 5, but the 
figure zooms into the responses area and represents the original scale from 2.5 to 3.3. The 
blue bars evidenced greater urgency and recurrence in respect to aspects one 1 and 9.  
On standard procedures and requirements: Most of the respondents found deficiencies in 
the mechanisms, standards and common procedures for promoting the flow and exchange 
of information with other organizations on cybercrime investigations (e.g. International or 
local agencies as the General Attorney Office, Telecommunications Service Providers, 
private sector organizations, etc.) This could indicate that although there are some 
mechanisms for interaction, these may not be entirely effective and do not meet the needs 
of the investigative process. 
On the legal framework: The respondents recognized some deficiencies in the legal 
system regarding mandatory preservation of the evidence and timely delivery of 
information to the authorities on a medium-high level of prioritization. These could be 
attributed to weaknesses in the regulatory framework that do not take into account the 
particularities of digital evidence and its impact on the preservation and delivery of 
information during investigations.  
On information sharing and certainty: The respondents evaluated at a midpoint the need 
to clarify and reduce uncertainty on legal procedures for sharing information related to 
cybercrime by third parties. Ranking with lowest score along with the fifth issue on trust. 
This could indicate that although flows of information between some stakeholders exist, 
interruptions or delays may occur because of ambiguities on internal regulations. 
On privacy and data protection issues: The respondents are not outstandingly aware of the 
importance of digital rights but considered of a high level of prioritization the need to 
increase awareness and knowledge on privacy and data protection when information needs 
to be distributed. This could indicate that stakeholders might fear interaction with the 
authorities, because of the potential liabilities that may result from mishandling sensitive 
information. Reservations like these may cause setbacks during the investigative process.  
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On relationships and trust: Medium to high was the respondent’s averaged response on 
the criticality and recurrence of the need to improve trust relationships for increasing 
interactions. Some resistance may remain among the stakeholders on the supply of 
information to authorities or mistrust in the existing practices and processes. 
On Automation in interaction: Respondents considered between mediums high the 
importance of implementation of automatic tools that facilitate the timely exchange of 
information (e.g. Web Portal, data repositories, encrypted information, secure channels). 
This could indicate that investigators are not familiar with the use of such tools to facilitate 
the exchange of information, and they would prefer to obtain information directly from 
third parties without technical limitations. 
On requirements and bureaucracy: To reduce bureaucratic obstacles and excessive 
procedural requirements in response to requests for assistance or information provided by 
third parties (e.g. authorities, telecommunications and infrastructure service providers, 
banking or private sector) ranked a high priority. This has often been considered 
complications in investigative process, but is also a guarantee of rational action by the 
state organs.  Generally, the transaction costs are attributed and may really be associated to 
lack of clear policies and ambiguous or inadequate procedures for investigations. 
On reluctance to mandatory reporting: Respondents considered that the issue of low 
reporting rates about incidents or offenses by cybercrime victims to authorities ranked 
medium high. This is a light dismissal of one of the major impediments in the fight against 
cybercrime because no investigation starts without an alert or criminal report; the fact that 
there is no mandatory reporting may cause lack of information and impunity.  
On forensic and data collection requirements: Respondents ranked this issue the highest 
priority of the nine, together with the first. This responds to realizations on that even 
though investigators are given some tools and follow predetermined processes to preserve 
the effectiveness of forensic investigations, the evolution of criminal techniques requires 
specialized training and the most advanced technologies and standards during 
investigative processes.  
The respondents were also asked an open question about their personal opinions on the 
criticality of organizational interaction needs linked to cybercrime investigations, and how 
to improve the investigative process. Only 24 out of 40 respondents elaborated in the 
answer on the issue, corresponding to 60% of the total. Nevertheless these answers can be 
associated coincide with claims and aspects discussed in this work. These texts were 
translated into English and grouped into categories on the basis of frequency. 
 
Figure 5 Organizational Interaction Open Question Chart 
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Figure 5 charts repeated reactions by respondents, listed in order of frequency. The seven 
most representative reactions resulted from re-grouping the 24 initial responses in 13 
based on similarity and then sorting recurrent terms. In the first place, the need for 
improving organizational interaction is manifested and was expressed in terms of 
cooperation with specific stakeholders (in coincidence with the stakeholders identification 
made in section 4.2 Table2). Timely information flows between the investigation units and 
others was the extent of the cooperation mentioned by respondents R3, R13, R15, R18, 
and R19. And examples of stakeholders were: social networks administrators, hosting 
providers and digital messaging services. In the remaining, respondents claim for 
harmonization of domestic laws and regulations, specifically R1, R8, R10, and R25; on 
reducing legal barriers and procedural boundaries such as excessive requirement or 
lengthy procedures commented R9, R14, R21, and R27; R33 and R35 stated mandatory 
reporting mechanisms would overcome issues of an underdeveloped security culture; 
training and expertise support; sensitization and training to prosecutors were an issue to 
consider by R18 and R34 only; and, appealing to international support seemed important 
to R30 and R2. Also, they emphasized the need for workforce (R39), budgetary 
allocations (R35), more training (R35), logistic support (R35) and assistance on specific 
cases such as ransomware (R30). 
The surveys can be said to have become a rank of criticality on specific needs that was 
evaluated by an expert group of law enforcement agents, representative for Colombia, 
from a unit that only handles cybercrime investigations. The results reaffirm the 
importance of the inclusion of elements in planning and control in the previous stages of 
the investigative process to facilitate the successful investigation of cybercrime. This was 
explained when the optimized model presented in this work reformulated Rogers’ six 
stages process (section 5.2 Table 7). Moreover, a regulatory framework that supports 
criminal investigation activities already exists, but seems not to adjust to the needs of the 
provision of information by third parties. A situation like this may cause in turn barriers 
and obstacles for providing information or the flow of resources to help the process. R1 
wrote “some legal procedures end up benefiting cybercriminals only…”. Setbacks are also 
common in the process of organizational interaction within stakeholders when they exist.  
Some of the limitations faced on the development of this survey were evidenced on the 
recurrence of values of criticality at mid points. It could be attributed to most of the 
respondents being responsible for investigative and administrative activities while the 
questionnaire was more oriented to strategic decision makers and officials working in 
managerial positions. Therefore, responses ranked high scores on issues related to 
standards and procedures, and forensic and data collection requirements. Understandable, 
these are the most critical activities that their tasks in the investigative process impose. In 
future studies, surveys and questionnaires should address specific domains of the 
investigative process, differentiated groups and expand on other fields of interest, for 
contrast and balance 
Summary of weaknesses and capabilities  
The Colombian government established the DIJIN-CCP, in 2011 responding to 
expectations consigned on the National Strategy CONPES 3701 [55]. The scope of 
operations of the unit is extends to the territory of the country but activities are 
coordinated from the Capital District Bogota. The CCP is specialized on cybercrime 
events and investigations and tasked with the protection of the interests of citizens and 
Government in the cyberspace17. For this work, since one of the promised research tasks 
                                                
17 Available at: http://www.ccp.gov.co/#servicios 
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was to perform an analysis of the current state on organizational interaction at the CCP 
(RT8), an examination in terms of structure and capabilities will follow. Accordingly, to 
complete this task, the existing regulatory framework, memberships to organizations and 
alliances, strategic alliances, mechanisms of collaboration, cooperation and sharing 
information studied on the conceptual developments on section 4.1, must be identified and 
recollected. Information is also retrieved from the categorization of needs studied on 
section 5.3 Table 8. The conclusions on this summary could show managers what are the 
organizational interaction strengths/capabilities and weaknesses in terms of decision-
making in the fight against cybercrime. The compilation of information is presented in 
Table 9.  
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Table 9. Current Status of Organizational Interaction on CCP 
NAME MECHANISM  DESCRIPTION 
Manpower 
development 
CNP has 180000 members across the country.  
DIJIN CPP 250 members (roles and responsibilities on cybercrime investigations).  
90 members working in capital city district, 210 in the rest of the country. 
Education, 
Professional training. 
20% professional certifications 
30% have technical certifications in in forensic technics and tools.  
50% not formal certifications, but informal training and certified experience. 
Criminal legislation Statutory Law 1273/ 2009 The Criminal Code, information and data protection  
Regulation and 
compliance 
Statutory Law 1266 /2008 Habeas data, personal data 
Statutory Law 1581 /2012 Privacy and data protection law 
Decree 1377 of 2013 Regulation on data protection law 
External Circular 052 /2010 and 042 
/2012 Financial Superintendence 
Data protection regulations and responsibilities in 
financial operations (Financial crimes) 
Statutory Law 1621 Intelligence and counterintelligence law 
Child online protection 
Statutory Law 1336 /2009 Child pornography  
Law 1273/ 2009 (Article 218, 219A) 
Law No. 679 
Child online protection 
UN Convention and Protocols Articles 16, 17(e) and 34(c); and Articles 2 and 3 
National Strategy, 
governance guidelines 
The Model of information security for 
government online strategy and COPES 
3701  
National Planning Policy guidelines for cyber security 
and defense, Renovation currently in development 
National/ local 
cooperation with 
accredited 
CSIRT/CERT 
CSIRT-Ponal; ColCERT; CSIRT-CCIT; 
CSIRT-ETB; DigiCSIRT; CSIRT 
OLYMPIA; SOC TEAM Claro; SOC-
CCOC. 
Eight accredited teams at national level, sharing 
information and regular meetings. 
National cooperation 
Private sector, NGO, 
GO. 
ASOBANCARIA, SAINET Ingenieria, 
RedPAPAZ, PuntoCO Internet, ICBF, 
Gobierno en Linea 
Public and private partners, for online child protection, 
financial security matters and online transactions. 
Agency certifications/ 
standards/ best 
practices 
ISO 27001 Information Security 
Management System ISMS  
Criminal Investigation, judicial investigation, forensic, 
and criminological; Administration of Criminal 
Information, Technology and Document Management 
processes 
Intra-state cooperation ColCERT and CSIRT Ponal Sharing of cybersecurity assets across borders  
Int. cooperation APWG and FIRST  Active member since 2012  
Institutional support The Police Cybernetic Centre  Reports and support on cybercrime and child online protection. 
Reporting mechanism 
The Police Cybernetic Centre and                                                 
National Prosecutor Office 
Victims can report both organizations, currently 
complaints and crimes can be online reported 
http://www.ccp.gov.co/contenido/cai-virtual-0 
International 
conventions 
Budapest Convention Submitted application in 2013, currently candidate 
Law Enforcement 
Cooperation 
AMERIPOL Active member since 2007 
INTERPOL I 24/7 Active member since 1954,  liaison officer 
EUROPOL EC3 Liaison officer, Cooperation in malware analysis. 
UNITED STATES FBI, DEA, ATA Supported by malware analysis laboratory 
OAS Inter-American Committee against 
Terrorism (CICTE) 
Cooperation to combat and eliminate terrorism 
Latin American Working Group of 
technological crimes GTDLT 
Active member of this community and currently holds 
the presidency 
Korea International Cooperation 
KOICA 
Support and training on security matters 
National Crime Agency NCA UK Combating organized crime 
First and second rows describe the structure of the agency in terms of workforce and 
training.  Starting form third row, the first column indicates the types of asset, mechanism, 
or statutes that the entity have, the second presents the denomination, and third describes 
the current status and nature of each. The information is an overview of the advances, 
capabilities, developments, and implementations of the entity in terms of organizational 
interaction. The data has been collected from internal and public sources of information, 
mainly from ITU “Cybersecurity & Cyberwellness Profiles Index, the Police Cybernetic 
Centre CCP and from the National Strategy documentation [55], [57], [58]
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From the data collected it can be observed serious deficiencies in the workforce and 
training that might require further attention. The quantity and quality of investigations and 
reports might be affected due to lack of workforce, inadequate training or excessive 
workload. Moreover, there are some advances in the regulatory frame in terms of criminal 
legislation, compliance and online child protection. However, as it was evidenced on the 
survey, this seems that it need to be adjusted in terms of regulated provision of 
information by third parties. The existing regulation do not contemplates strict parameters 
on aspects such as mandatory report on crimes, storage directives, provision of logs, and 
timely provision of information by service providers regarding to responsibilities and 
ownership for IT Resources (e.g. IP addresses, URLs, mail and social networks accounts, 
cloud services). In addition, it can be observed some advances on the establishment of 
organizational interaction at national and international levels. However, due to the survey 
evidenced greater level of criticality on cooperation with specific stakeholders, the 
agreements could not cover all the expected needs of the investigative process. As special 
limitations it can be observed that Colombia has not still achieved the accession to 
Budapest the Convention, and there are not sufficient organizational interaction at regional 
levels. However, there are some strengthens on organizational interaction in international 
spheres, especially with Europol, Interpol, and GTDLT. 
5.5 Guidelines to Promote Collaborative Interaction  
Despite the existence and practice of existing models of collaboration, cooperation, and 
exchange of information between LEAs and stakeholders, it is important to consider the 
evaluation and the incorporation of renewed guidelines for the improvement of the 
organizational interactions during cybercrime investigative process. The implementation 
of such practices could help to reduce constraints, and overcome obstacles and barriers 
when decision-makers are facing complex investigative challenges. This part condenses 
some of the most important setbacks discussed throughout this study and states a the 
minimum conditions that could help promote collaboration, cooperation and information 
sharing schemes, at the strategic level for cybercrime investigations success organizational 
interaction for cybercrime investigations success. The guidelines drawn from the 
weaknesses (needs) that were detected during preparatory stages according to the 
optimized cybercrime investigation model presented and discussed on table 7. These 
guidelines could be considered a valuable instrument especially for managers of LEAs for 
the analysis and practice of organizational interaction components affecting cybercrime 
investigations. These considerations are linked to the analysis of needs during cybercrime 
investigations performed on section 5.3 and presented on the analysis of table 8. 
1. Development of management procedures, models and standards to contribute to 
organizational interaction success. Maintaining consistency, completeness, and 
accuracy in the investigative process could impact the process and the results. The 
initiatives should simplify procedures and bureaucratic requirements to 
investigations, prosecution, and digital forensics responsibilities, reducing legal 
obstacles on the delivery of information, harmonizing data protection law, and 
reducing privacy concerns. (Connected to managerial need No1).  
2. The clarification of legal framework on data protection could help to reduce the 
risk of uncertainty and improve information flows, especially when privacy 
concerns and data protection issues are presented. (Connected to managerial need 
No 2).  
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3. The promotion of relationships of trust in the stakeholder’s community could help 
to increase the benefits of organizational interaction. This could be achieved by the 
clarification of policies, emphasizing on shared benefits and common goals, 
establishing reliability in the investigative process, and encouraging long-term 
relationships. However, improving trust relationships could also require long-term 
strategies to increase trustworthiness in processes and reduce conflicts of interest. 
The promotion of regular face-to-face meetings, exchange of experiences, ideas, 
and knowledge about methods, processes, and techniques relating to investigations 
and security in advanced technologies in the field of cybercrime, are expamples of 
the possibilities. (Connected to managerial need No 3); 
4. Managers could consider branding strategies for positioning the status of LEAs to 
obtain recognition and prevent reputational risk. This could generate brand 
recordation, and therefore, better support from international community and 
counterparts. LEAs, also could obtain better benefits on organizational interaction 
accessing to memberships, associations and organizations in the field of 
cybercrime (Connected to managerial need No 4);  
5. The inclusion of secure platforms, protected communication channels, and 
automatic mechanisms for data exchange, could safeguard information flows 
during investigative processes. The implementation of such instruments (web 
portal, incident repositories, cyphered communications, etc.), could reduce 
proliferation of communication channels, in favour of standardization of 
terminology, reducing obstacles and language barriers on organizational interaction 
(Connected to managerial need No 5);  
6. In some cases, mandatory mechanisms for organizational interaction could indeed 
be counterproductive. This could generate resistance or scepticism in the 
stakeholder community, affecting the expected results for the investigative process. 
Each particular case should be considered separately, reducing legal restrictions 
and preventing waste of efforts in establishing formal agreements with specific 
partners (Connected to managerial need No 6);  
7. The development of strategies for proper management of human resources could 
impact organizational interaction. Cybercrime investigation may face excessive 
workload in day-to-day operations, affecting productivity as in any other type of 
work. The managers should consider by prioritizing efforts, improving the quality 
of reports, and impacting positively in post-processing data. It includes delegation 
and associating other agencies to advising on cases and provide or receiving 
technical assistance. (Connected to managerial need No 7); 
8. Promoting the establishment of organizational interaction agreements with specific 
stakeholders for supporting special cases. The investigative process may faces 
weaknesses and gaps the stages identified earlier with the help of the optimized 
investigation model. In some cases, it would be desirable to concentrate efforts in 
creating agreements with key stakeholders (Courts, abuse teams, ISPs, security 
service providers, independent researchers, malware repositories, hosting 
providers, and network operators, among others) to be able to intervene the stages 
of the process more affected. Moreover, with the Promotion of such agreements, it 
would be advisable to evaluate the possibility to invite third parties or monitorinf 
instances transparency and control (Connected to managerial need No 8). 
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6 Concluding	Remarks	
The activities perfumed on RT1 demonstrated the importance of differentiating concepts 
and terminology associated with organizational interaction mechanisms such as 
collaboration, cooperation, and sharing information. This theoretical precision is a key 
factor in the establishment of a common language among the stakeholder community. The 
integration of different concepts and theories of law, criminology, computational, and 
social sciences was successful in filling some knowledge gaps and helped to advance on 
issues of strategic management research applied to cybercrime. Also, with the exploration 
of organizational interaction during cybercrime investigations performed on RT2, the 
analysis of requirements of LEAs made on RT3, and; the comparison of existing models 
of the investigative process, stages, components performed en RT4, the categorization and 
classification into an optimized model proposed on RT5 was possible. This can be said to 
be a first step in resolving one of the most significant impediments that may obstruct 
decision-making in the process of cybercrime investigations. 
The analysis of organizational interaction in law enforcement decision-making spheres 
was useful to respond to RQ1. It indicates that the cybercrime investigative process could 
be adversely affected by the lack of reporting, deficiencies in models or formal standards 
or deficits on collaborative mechanisms. It also indicates that due to the lack of 
management procedures; legal and procedural obstacles; privacy questions; trust issues; 
low interest from partners; technical barriers; delays in providing information, and 
mandatory reporting mechanisms; are among others the main obstacles to achieving the 
success of investigations. This has been found to apply to cybercrime as much as it does 
traditional criminal investigations, or even more considering their transnational 
implications.  
RQ2 was evidenced on the importance of addressing the necessary conditions to generate 
an ideal environment, identifying and overcoming barriers when facing the effective 
exchange of information, becoming a challenge and a task for managers and policy 
makers. The applicability of the optimized was demonstrated on RT6. The results 
evidenced that with the inclusion of management elements, particularly in the preparatory 
stage of the process, could facilitate interaction with stakeholders and the provision of 
information to support the investigative process. Furthermore, with the implementation of 
administration procedures, it could maintain the relationship of trust with stakeholders, 
increasing the information flows, and improving interaction and efficiency in the 
investigative process. Law enforcement alone cannot effectively combat cybercrime. It 
requires the establishment of organizational interaction mechanisms that reduce barriers 
and help to meet the challenges that decision and policy makers have to face and 
overcome.  
The need to increase awareness especially on strategic levels for the implementation of 
improvement mechanisms, guidelines, and best practices for supporting complex 
cybercrime investigations remains challenging. However, since the purpose of RQ1 was to 
identify what are the main obstacles concerning interaction with stakeholders during the 
investigative process, to obtain an actual measurement or an objective evaluation of the 
results in the implementation of these proposals was beyond the scope of this work. For 
this reason, assuming that the needs analysis provide valuable evidence to detect what part 
of the process requires greater focus, this thesis proposes according to RT9, a set of 
improvement actions, that may increase the practice of interaction and optimize the results 
of the investigative process. For a factual verification, it would be necessary to make a 
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measurable implementation over a period, and case studies or periodical observations that 
may open an avenue for future research.  
This thesis contributes to theoretical development, clarification of key terms resulting 
from the interdisciplinary integration of concepts and theories, and practical instruments 
applicable to guide managerial organizational interaction mechanisms in cybercrime 
investigations. Other contributions of meaningful implications are the results of the 
analysis of needs, the guidelines for the implementation of best practices, and the proposal 
of implementation of an optimized model of investigation based on the need of 
organizational interaction. Those conform a toolbox of practical instruments for the 
implementation of managerial techniques to enhance effectiveness and support decision-
making in combating cybercrime. The work is geared towards the managers in Law 
Enforcement Agencies LEAs, or anyone interested in consulting organizational interaction 
on the cybercrime investigative process.  
The needs analysis and the original model proposed helps to identify gaps and when to 
intervene and compensate for the weakness that may appear at certain stages during the 
investigative process. Moreover, The Guidelines for the implementation of best practices 
are a practical instrument for the communication of policies and the implementation of 
management procedures. These establish interaction mechanisms that reduce language 
barriers across stakeholders´ groups. The applied surveys on RT7, and the case study 
presented on RT8, were performed based on the Colombian National Police and its 
organizational interaction capabilities. This is a valuable empirical contribution that 
supports the understanding of the phenomenon of interaction in practice. Policy and 
decision makers of LEAs, and in particular at the Cybercrime Center CCP, get tools for 
evaluation and consultation that can be a basis for implementing policies, guidelines, 
management, allocation of resources, raise awareness, and the inclusion of improved 
interaction mechanisms. All in all, new models optimize traditional ones, while preserving 
their best features. 
The limitations of this study were in part due to the difficulties obtaining official sources 
of information in preparation for the diagnosis on the organizational interaction 
capabilities between the Colombian Cybercrime Center and other stakeholders. And in 
part to the time constraints for a more detailed application in the determination of the 
properties of information flows in cases of organizational interaction. Moreover, while the 
needs analysis was conducted according to up to date information, relying on current 
typologies, the changing nature of cybercrime may require continuous revision. Needs 
evolve and cannot be predicted or treated within the scope of one single work. 
Consequently, is important to update the analysis of needs according to the emergence and 
evolution of new requirements, making constant adjustments in the improvement of the 
cybercrime investigation processes. 
The thesis deals with only a few of the available aspects of organizational interaction with 
stakeholders in cybercrime investigations; so opportunities to explore and consolidate this 
work abound. Two ways are, for example, to test the effectiveness of the model and 
evaluate results on the incorporation of managerial elements of planning and control in the 
pre and post-processing stages of the investigation. Besides, the use of the model in 
practice, if monitored and kept in records, could be addressed with the use of quantitative 
methods. For this purpose, performance indicators and measuring scales must be devised 
to assess the effectiveness and degree of which improvements increased process 
efficiency. This highlights that the management of operations and organizational 
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interaction is an ongoing process that could benefit from further studies and other research 
methods in the long perspective.  
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Appendix		
I. Survey	
Questions addressed to conduct the analysis of the current state of priorities on 
collaboration mechanisms on cybercrime investigations at the Cybercrime Center, 
Colombia National Police. 
Please rate from 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest value and 5 the maximum, about your 
perception of what are the major impediments, obstacles and requirements that criminal 
investigation process faces regarding collaboration and / or efficient delivery and timely 
information by third parties in the investigation of cybercrime. 
1. Deficiencies in mechanisms, common standards and procedures that promote the 
flow and exchange of information with other organizations in cyber crimes 
investigations (e.g. International or local agencies as Attorney, 
Telecommunications Service Providers, private sector, etc.) 
 
2. Deficiencies in legal system concerning mandatory preservation of evidence and 
timely delivery of information to the authorities. 
3. Lack of clarity and uncertainty of the legal procedure for sharing information 
related to cybercrime by third parties.  
 
4. Lack of knowledge by those who provide information on matters related to privacy 
and protection of personal data. 
 
5. Lack of trust and deficiencies in personal relationships with third parties. 
 
6. Lack of automation tools that facilitate the timely exchange of information (e.g.: 
web portal, data repositories, encrypted information, secure channels). 
 
7. Bureaucratic impediments, obstacles and excessive procedural requirements in 
response to requests for assistance or information provided by other authorities, 
service providers or telecommunications infrastructure, banks or private sector.  
 
8. Lack of reporting to authorities on behaviours, incidents or offenses by victims of 
cybercrime. 
 
9. Deficiencies in the process of collection digital evidence and forensics. 
 
Additional open question  
 
10. Where do you think it should be prioritized intervention efforts to improve 
collaboration on cybercrime investigations? 
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II. List of Abbreviations 
 
AMERIPOL The Police Community of the Americas 
APWG Anti-Phishing Working Group 
BKA  BundesKriminAlamt German Police  
CAI Centro de Atencion Inmediata Colombia 
CCoC Comando Conjunto Cibernetico Colombia 
CCP Centro Cibernetico Policial Colombia 
CI Critical Infrastructure 
CICTE  Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo 
Col CERT Colombia Computer Emergency Response Team 
CONPES Consejo Nacional de Politica Economica y Social 
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team 
DFRW Digital Forensics Research Workshop  
DIJIN Direccion de Investigacion Criminal Colombia 
ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency 
EU European Union 
EUROPOL European Law Enforcement Organization 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 
GO Governmental Organizations 
HTCIA High Technology Crime Investigation Association  
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization 
ISO International Standard Organization 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
IT  Information Technologies 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
KPMG Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler consulting services 
LEAs Law Enforcement Agencies 
NCSS National Cyber Security Strategy 
NCA National Crime Agency UK 
NCCU National Cyber Crime Unit UK 
NCIJTF  FBI National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force 
NGO No Governmental Organizations 
OAS Organization of American States 
PERF Police Executive Research Forum 
PPP Public-Private- Partnerships  
RQ Research Question 
RT Research Task 
SOC Security Operation Center 
UNODC  United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 
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